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Abstract 
 
My dissertation empirically examines whether characteristics of one's social groups influence an 
individual's preferences for redistribution.  I begin by focusing on the socioeconomic status of the ethnic 
and religious groups one belongs to.  First, I develop a theoretical framework where an individual's 
identity is strengthened by the status of their group.  Then, utilizing data from the US General Social 
Survey, I find evidence that the average incomes of one's ethnic and religious groups are negatively 
correlated with one's preferences for redistribution.  Controlling for household income, and a number of 
other individual-level characteristics and additional controls, I find that a standard deviation increase in 
the average income of one's social groups correlates to a weakening of an individual's preferences for 
redistribution by seven to eight percentage points.  This result is robust to the inclusion of rich controls 
and alternate measures of group status, as well as a number of robustness checks, such as sample 
restrictions and the use of additional data.  I then examine the relative importance a culture places on 
individualism vs. collectivism.  Utilizing data from the European Social Survey, I find evidence that 
immigrants who were born in countries with a more individualistic culture tend to have weaker 
preferences for redistribution in their residence country.  A standard deviation increase in the 
individualism of one's home country culture correlates to a weakening of an individual's preferences for 
redistribution by twelve percentage points.  This relationship appears to be as strong as that between 
household income and preferences for redistribution (eleven percentage points).  This result is robust to 
the inclusion of rich controls and the use of sample restrictions.  The relationship appears to be stronger 
among immigrants who vote, belong to an ethnic minority and live in a country with a relatively high 
number of ethnic minorities.  I also find that the relationship between preferences for redistribution and i) 
household income and ii) education is stronger among immigrants born in a country with an 
individualistic culture. Moreover, my analysis suggests that this trait is transmitted across generations, 
and bears some influence on the preferences for redistribution of second-generation immigrants as well.   
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Chapter 1:  Group status and individual preferences for redistribution 
1.1 Introduction 
 As social beings, the groups that we as humans identify with play an important role in our lives.  
These groups vary in a number of ways.  A basic characteristic of any social group is its socioeconomic 
status.  Groups also vary in the degree to which its members support redistributive policies.  It is intuitive 
to suggest that, on average, wealthier groups tend to be less supportive of redistributive policies than 
poorer groups.  What is less clear is whether or not this is simply because wealthy groups are comprised 
of wealthy individuals who, due to their own economic self-interest, have relatively weak preferences for 
redistribution.  This paper begins to answer this question by empirically examining the relationship 
between the socioeconomic status of one's group and one's preferences for redistribution.  Through 
regression analysis of US General Social Survey data, I find that the average income of one's ethnic and 
religious groups has a negative and significant relationship with one's preferences for redistribution 
(captured by their response to a general question regarding redistributive policies in the US).  A standard 
deviation increase in the average income of one's social group is associated with preferences for 
redistribution that are seven to eight percentage points weaker, all else being equal.  While causality 
issues (in particular, omitted variable bias) can never be fully overcome, I attempt to minimize these 
issues by controlling for a comprehensive set of individual and group level traits.  These include 
household income, education (of the individual, their parents and their spouse), age, marital status, work 
status, prospects for social mobility and the individualism-collectivism of one's group.  Nevertheless, the 
relationship retains its statistical and economic significance.  I also find that this relationship is quite 
robust to different variables for group socioeconomic status, different variables for an individual's voting 
preferences and a number of sample restrictions (according to household income, continent of ancestry, 
religious denomination, number of generations respondent's family has lived in the US and respondent's 
attendance of religious services). 
 
 
 The empirical results provide evidence that an individual belonging to a relatively poor group is 
expected to have stronger preferences for income redistribution than an otherwise identical individual 
who belongs to a relatively wealthy social group, in spite of the fact that more redistribution may not 
directly help the individual (and may actually decrease the individual's own level of consumption).  This 
is precisely the type of contradiction that identity economics may be able to explain.  Specifically, 
"identity can explain behaviour that appears detrimental," (Akerlof and Kranton 2000) such as 
redistribution preferences that are stronger than one's income level would suggest were optimal, because 
"identity changes the payoffs from one's own actions" (Akerlof and Kranton 2000). 
 These findings produce some important implications.  The relationship between group 
socioeconomic status and an individual's preferences for redistribution has not, to the best of my 
knowledge, been established empirically in the literature.  This paper attempts to fill that gap.  Moreover, 
my paper's results suggest that individuals make choices which are not entirely driven by economic self-
interest.  Rather, the results suggest that individuals also consider the effects those choices have on 
members of their social groups.  As such, the findings serve to support the theory of identity economics, 
specifically the inclusion of group characteristics into the utility function.  In doing so, the results lend 
further weight to the emerging idea that economists could examine economic choices beyond the 
traditional prism of economic self-interest.  Finally, I provide evidence that group status not only 
influences one's preferences for redistribution but also their voting choice, which could have implications 
for government policy. 
 This paper primarily relates to the work done by Klor and Shayo (2010).  Klor and Shayo (2010) 
use experimental testing to examine the relationship between group status and voting decisions.  In their 
study, undergraduate students were split into two groups of nine.  At the beginning of each round (there 
were forty rounds in total), each group was randomly assigned an income distribution such that one group 
was "poor" and the other group was "rich".  Each student was then randomly assigned a gross income and 
notified of their group's mean income and the mean income of the two groups together.  They were then 
asked to choose a preferred tax rate between two options: 20% and 40%.  Klor and Shayo found that, on 
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average, those who were assigned to the "poorer" group were roughly twenty percent more likely to 
prefer the high tax rate than those who were assigned to the "richer" group, after controlling for their 
gross incomes.  The authors note that "given that the groups we used are extremely weak, it is not 
improbable that in real life situations individuals consistently forego personal gains for the wellbeing of 
their groups" (Klor and Shayo 2010).  This paper relates to their research by using regression analysis on 
survey data to provide evidence that their experimental results hold in the real world.  In doing so, it looks 
at the way in which the socioeconomic status of people's actual social groups are correlated with their 
actual preferences for redistribution. 
 The concept of group identification has a basis in social identity theory.  Like identity economics, 
social identity theory emphasises the idea that part of an individual's self-image is derived from 
membership in social groups.  In one experiment, researchers had test subjects cooperate and compete 
with one another on either a one-on-one basis or in groups.  They found that test subjects experienced 
similarly large increases in self-esteem whether they were working on their own or in groups, suggesting 
that individuals evaluate themselves in terms of their membership in social groups in a meaningful way 
(Hogg et al 1986).  On the basis of these and other findings, Turner (the pre-eminent social identity 
theorist) concluded that "shared social identifications, therefore, should tend to induce a form of 
cooperation between group members that verges on altruism, since others' needs are perceived as one's 
own" (Turner 1989). 
 When one incorporates a group's identity into their own self-identity, as argued in identity 
economics and social identity theory, a common result is ethnocentric altruism.  The negative relationship 
between group status and one's preferences for redistribution is one such example.  Individuals belonging 
to low-income groups may exhibit altruistic behaviour (consciously or not) by having preferences for 
redistribution that are stronger than their own characteristics would suggest was optimal.  The 
sociobiological theory of ethnic nepotism explains such altruism by extending W. D. Hamilton's theory of 
kin selection (Hamilton 1964).  Kin selection allows us to understand why an individual is altruistic 
towards its closest family; since an individual's family members share many of its genes, even actions of 
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self-sacrifice by the individual can ensure that its genes propagate in the future.  As a result, genes for 
altruism spread through the population.  Given that our prehistoric ancestors lived in groups of family 
members (both immediate and distant), they may have eventually evolved to be altruistic to their broader 
social group, rather than limiting their altruism to their immediate family.  With those same genes 
transplanted into the present day, it's possible that modern humans still feel heightened levels of altruism 
to those they identify (consciously or not) as fellow group members (Salter 2003). 
 Examples of ethnocentric altruism abound in the literature.  A study based in Moscow found that 
ethnic Russians were most generous to Russian beggars, followed by beggars of the genetically related 
Moldavian ethnicity and, lastly, beggars of the genetically distant Romani ethnicity (Butovskaya et al 
2000).  Cross-country regressions reveal a significant, negative relationship between the racial 
heterogeneity of a country and its level of welfare spending relative to GDP, suggesting that voters are 
less inclined to support welfare spending if the benefits are not necessarily going to be enjoyed by 
members of their racial group (Alesina et al 2001).  Finally, micro-level regressions have shown that an 
individual's support for welfare spending is positively related to the share of welfare recipients in their 
local area that belong to the same racial group (Luttmer 2001).  In each case, individuals are showing 
some degree of preferential treatment to members of their own group. 
 This paper also relates to a number of recent papers which examine preferences for redistribution 
using survey data (Luttmer 2001, Alesina et al 2001, Alesina and Giuliano 2009a, Giuliano and 
Spilimbergo 2009, Luttmer and Singhal 2011).  These papers include some basic results which allude to a 
relationship between these preferences and the socioeconomic status of one's groups.  Virtually every 
paper which has examined redistribution preferences in the US includes a control for race.  Each time, 
black individuals are shown to have stronger preferences for redistribution than white individuals, all else 
being equal (Luttmer 2001, Alesina et al 2001).  A number of papers, using simple binary variables, have 
found that membership in different religions have differing effects on an individual's redistribution 
preferences as well (Alesina and Giuliano 2009a, Giuliano and Spilimbergo 2009).  My paper takes this 
analysis one step further by examining a specific difference across these ethnic and religious groups, 
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socioeconomic status.  These findings corroborate a number of stylized facts presented by Lipset (1960) 
which showed that individuals who belong to ethnic or religious minorities have long held strong voting 
preferences for leftist political parties.  These preferences were typically stronger than non-minorities of 
comparable income and education levels.  This paper also relates to a great deal of literature which has 
empirically examined the relationship between some economic choice an individual makes and some 
characteristic of their group.  Preferences for redistribution appear to be correlated with one's birth 
country's preferences for redistribution (Alesina and Giuliano 2009a, Luttmer and Singhal 2011) and 
recession in one's region during early adulthood (Giuliano and Spilimbergo 2009, Alesina and Giuliano 
2009a).  The varying importance of family ties among ethnic groups has been shown to influence an 
individual's labour choices (Alesina, Algan, Cahuc and Giuliano 2013) and level of political participation 
(Alesina and Giuliano 2009b). 
 The paper is organized as follows.  The next section presents a theoretical framework to help 
understand how group identification can influence a person's preferences for redistribution.  Section three 
outlines the sources from which this paper's data was derived and discusses the methodology used in the 
empirical analysis.  Section four presents the empirical findings.  Section five concludes. 
1.2 Theoretical Framework 
 The focus of this paper is to examine the empirical relationship between a group's socioeconomic 
status and the preferences for redistribution chosen by individual group members.  While there may be a 
number of different reasons for this relationship, the idea that individuals identify with their group and are 
aware of their group's status seems particularly relevant.  As such, it is useful to clarify the basic manner 
in which one's preferences for redistribution, typically viewed as a choice based on economic self-
interest, can be influenced by an individual's identification with their social group and awareness of the 
group's socioeconomic status.   
 The theoretical framework is based on the original Meltzer-Richard model (1981), with some 
modifications.  The key difference is the assumption that an individual's utility is determined by the 
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weighted sum of their own consumption level, 𝑐𝑖, as well as the average consumption level of their social 
group, 𝑐𝑔, which is taken to represent a group's socioeconomic status: 
𝑢𝑖 = 𝑢�𝑐𝑖 , 𝑐𝑔� = 𝑢�𝛾𝑐𝑖 + (1 − 𝛾)𝑐𝑔� 
 For simplicity, I take the lead of Klor and Shayo (2010) and use a utility function in which an 
individual's consumption and their group's status are additively separable.  The utility function is 
increasing and strictly concave for both 𝑐𝑖 and 𝑐𝑔, which are normal goods.  The relative importance of 
one's own consumption level and the average consumption level of one's group is equal to the exogenous 
parameter 𝛾 ∈ (0,1).   
 Identity economics provides the primary motivation for incorporating group status into the utility 
function.  Akerlof and Kranton (2000) argue that "utility depends on [an individual's] identity or self-
image" and that "a person assigned a category with higher social status may enjoy an enhanced self-
image."  Thus, Akerlof and Kranton suggest that, through one's self-image, increases in the 
socioeconomic status of one's social groups can serve to increase one's utility.  This assumption allows us 
to eventually conclude that group income (and, more broadly, socioeconomic status) negatively affects a 
person's preferences for redistribution. 
 There are N individuals in the economy and Ng individuals in group g.  As in the Meltzer-Richard 
model (1981), each individual receives one unit of labour and some level of productivity, 𝛼𝑖, which 
differs across individuals.  For simplicity, I assume that individuals do not have a choice between labour 
and leisure.  Instead, they supply their unit of labour inelastically.  As a result, 𝛼𝑖 can be taken to 
represent individual i's pre-tax income.  Each group's mean income is denoted by 𝛼𝑔, whereas the mean 
income level across all individuals in the economy is denoted by 𝛼�.   Individual income, 𝛼𝑖, is determined 
by the distribution 𝐹(⋅) which has a leftward skew, such that 𝛼� > 𝛼𝑚 (mean income is greater than 
median income).  For the sake of simplicity, both N and Ng are assumed to be large enough that 
𝜕𝛼�
𝜕𝛼𝑖
= 1
𝑁
≅
0 and 𝜕𝛼𝑔
𝜕𝛼𝑖
= 1
𝑁𝑔
≅ 0. 
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 The government imposes a linear income tax t to finance lump sum transfers r that results in a 
wastage equal to 𝑤𝑡2 per person which captures the distortionary cost of taxation (Alesina and Giuliano 
2009a).  This term is used in the literature to represent the decrease in labour supplied and, thus, tax 
revenue caused by an increase in the tax rate.  This gives us the government budget constraint: 
𝑁𝑟 = �𝛼𝑖𝑡 − 𝑁𝑤𝑡2 
which can be simplified to a per worker basis: 
𝑟 = 𝛼�𝑡 − 𝑤𝑡2 
 There is no saving in this economy.  An individual's consumption is equal to their after-tax 
income plus the size of the lump sum transfers (Meltzer and Richard 1981).  Substituting in the per 
worker government budget constraint gives us individual i's budget constraint: 
𝑐𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖(1− 𝑡) + 𝑟 = 𝛼𝑖(1 − 𝑡) + 𝛼�𝑡 − 𝑤𝑡2 
 We will assume that all individuals have some non-zero level of income (𝛼𝑖 > 0 ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁) and, 
thus, that all individuals have some non-zero level of consumption ( 𝑐𝑖 > 0 ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁). 
 We can use the individual's budget constraint to derive the average consumption level of group g: 
𝑐𝑔 = ∑ 𝑐𝑖𝑖∈𝑔𝑁𝑔  
= ∑ (𝛼𝑖(1 − 𝑡) + 𝛼�𝑡 − 𝑤𝑡2)𝑖∈𝑔
𝑁𝑔
 
𝑐𝑔 = 𝛼𝑔(1 − 𝑡) + 𝛼�𝑡 − 𝑤𝑡2 
 With these equations for ci and cg, we can derive the preferred tax rate of individual i who is a 
member of group g (tig) by determining the tax rate t that maximizes individual i's utility: max
𝑡∈[0,1]𝑢�𝑐𝑖 , 𝑐𝑔� = max𝑡∈[0,1]𝑢�𝛾𝛼𝑖(1 − 𝑡) + (1 − 𝛾)𝛼𝑔(1− 𝑡) + 𝛼�𝑡 − 𝑤𝑡2� 
0 = 𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝑡
= 𝑢′�𝛾𝛼𝑖�1− 𝑡𝑖𝑔� + (1 − 𝛾)𝛼𝑔�1− 𝑡𝑖𝑔� + 𝛼�𝑡𝑖𝑔 − 𝑤𝑡𝑖𝑔2��−𝛾𝛼𝑖 − (1 − 𝛾)𝛼𝑔 + 𝛼� − 2𝑤𝑡𝑖𝑔� 
𝑡𝑖𝑔 = 𝛼� − 𝛾𝛼𝑖 − (1 − 𝛾)𝛼𝑔2𝑤  
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 Taking partial derivatives shows us that individual i's preferred tax rate is negatively affected by, 
individual i's own income (the key result of the Meltzer-Richard (1981) model): 
𝜕𝑡𝑖𝑔
𝜕𝛼𝑖
= −𝛾2𝑤 < 0 
and by the average income of individual i's group g: 
𝜕𝑡𝑖𝑔
𝜕𝛼𝑔
= −(1 − 𝛾)2𝑤 < 0 
 The introduction of group-level consumption into an individual's utility function allows us to see 
that individuals who belong to richer groups can be expected to have weaker preferences for 
redistribution.  This is the focus of my paper. 
1.3 Data and Methodology 
 I estimate the preferences for redistribution of individual i (who belongs to group g) with the 
following specification, 
 RedistributionPreferencesig = β0 + β1GroupStatusg + Xi β2 + εi 
where RedistributionPreferencesig are the preferences for redistribution of individual i (who belongs to 
group g), GroupStatusg is the socioeconomic status of the group g to which individual i is a member of, Xi 
is a set of control variables relevant to individual i and εi is an error term.  GroupStatusg varies only across 
groups, not across years.  All regressions are run using OLS.  Standard errors are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and clustered by ethnic or religious group. 
 The General Social Survey (GSS), a sociological survey conducted by the National Opinion 
Research Center (NORC) at the University of Chicago (Davis and Smith 2009) since 1972, asks 
individuals a number of questions covering a number of topics.  While the GSS has been running since 
1972, I use data from the years 1983 to 2008, as some relevant questions were omitted in the first few 
years that the survey was conducted.  Of interest to this paper, the GSS asks respondents a number of 
demographical questions, as well as questions pertaining to redistribution preferences.  The variable I use 
for an individual’s preferences for government redistribution is based on the following question: “Some 
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people think that the government in Washington should do everything possible to improve the standard of 
living of all poor Americans; they are at Point 1 on this card.  Other people think it is not the 
government’s responsibility, and that each person should take care of himself; they are at Point 5.”  In 
order to simplify the meaning of my results, I converted this variable such that higher values of this 
variable correspond to stronger preferences for government redistribution.  In my sample, the average 
respondent has preferences for redistribution slightly greater than three (Table 1.1).  That is, the average 
respondent is slightly in favour of redistribution. 
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Variable N Mean SD Min Max
Dependent Variables
Individual preference for redistribution 14494 3.08 1.15 1 5
Respondent's political ideology 24987 3.89 1.36 1 7
Respondent's political party identification 27847 4.25 2.01 1 7
Respondent's preference for income equality 16768 4.25 1.94 1 7
Voted for Democrat presidential candidate in last election 16862 0.49 0.50 0 1
Key Explanatory Variables
Average income of respondent's ethnic group 14494 43060 5792 31529 58838
Average view towards homosexuality of respondent's ethnic group 14494 2.16 0.20 1.86 2.89
Average income of respondent's religious group 12142 43361 6067 24611 59429
Average view towards homosexuality of respondent's religious group 12142 1.75 0.35 1.10 3.26
Average income of respondent's ethnic group (Census) 14494 57526 11791 35194 88133
Average income of respondent's religious group (Pew) 11899 58241 6105 45125 75725
Control Variables
Household income 14494 43102 28128 427 128125
Has a child in the household 14494 0.71 0.45 0 1
Size of household 14494 2.60 1.44 0 11
Male 14494 0.46 0.50 0 1
Age 14494 44.81 16.81 18 89
Black 14494 0.12 0.32 0 1
Married 14494 0.53 0.50 0 1
Unemployed 14494 0.03 0.17 0 1
Highest Level of Education Completed
Graduate Degree 14494 0.08 0.26 0 1
Bachelor's Degree 14494 0.17 0.37 0 1
Associate's Degree 14494 0.06 0.25 0 1
High School 14494 0.53 0.50 0 1
Spouse's Highest Level of Education Completed
More than high school 14494 0.16 0.37 0 1
High school 14494 0.28 0.45 0 1
Less than high school 14494 0.08 0.27 0 1
Self-employed 14494 0.11 0.32 0 1
Union member 14494 0.19 0.39 0 1
Father completed more than high school 14494 0.15 0.35 0 1
Father completed high school 14494 0.30 0.46 0 1
Mother completed more than high school 14494 0.12 0.33 0 1
Mother completed high school 14494 0.43 0.50 0 1
Lives in an urban area 14494 0.30 0.46 0 1
Lives in a suburban area 14494 0.34 0.48 0 1
Spouse is currently employed 14494 0.30 0.46 0 1
Respondent ever worked 14494 0.26 0.44 0 1
Respondent foreign born 14494 0.09 0.29 0 1
One or more parents foreign born 14494 0.11 0.32 0 1
One or more grandparents foreign born 14494 0.25 0.43 0 1
Attends religious services at least once a month 14494 0.50 0.50 0 1
Ever unemployed for more a month 14494 0.29 0.46 0 1
Respondent's family income at age 16 10170 2.81 0.88 1 5
Respondent's occupational prestige > father's occupational prestige 11600 0.49 0.50 0 1
IC rating of respondent's ethnic group 11980 7.07 1.45 2 8.95
Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics, Summary of Variables
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Derivation of Group Socioeconomic Status 
 In any given regression, group g represents one of two group types: ethnicity and religion.  A 
person’s ethnicity is determined by their answer to the following question: “From what countries or part 
of the world did your ancestors come?  If more than one country named, which one of these countries do 
you feel closer to?”.  The full list of ethnicities included in the regressions is found in Table 1.2.  The 
majority of ethnicities included are based on a specific country of origin (i.e. Germany, Russia, India), 
though some more general ethnicities were included as well (i.e. Arabic, Latinos from a country not 
specifically mentioned, American Indian).  A person's religion is determined by the question: "What is 
your religious preference?"  In most cases, a person's religious preference is a denomination of 
Christianity.  The full list of religious groups included in the regressions is found in Table 1.3.  The mean 
religious and ethnic group income levels in my sample are quite similar (roughly $43 000), both to each 
other and to the mean household income (Table 1.1). 
 Thus, GroupStatusg takes on one of two values in the different baseline regressions: the average 
income of one's ethnic group or the average income of one's religious group.  The income of each ethnic 
group and religious group are derived from the respondents' answers.  For instance, in the full GSS data 
set, 323 respondents identified themselves as having Danish ancestry.  Among those 323 respondents, 252 
reported their income, the average of which was $47 098.  As a side note, all incomes have been adjusted 
for inflation with a base year of 2000.  Thus, in regressions where g was individual i's ethnic group, each 
individual who identified themselves as having Danish ancestry would have had GroupStatusg equal to 
$47 098.  The same methodology was used when g represented religious groups.  In robustness checks, 
GroupStatusg will also capture a group's average education level and socioeconomic index (a measure 
developed by the GSS). 
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 N Mean SD N Mean SD
Africa Africa 1835 3.74 1.14 3139 31617 25144
American Indian Americas 900 3.18 1.23 1526 33195 25183
Arabic Asia 43 3.40 1.18 74 42504 32614
Austria Western Europe 112 2.97 1.23 186 46922 31147
Belgium Western Europe 37 2.97 1.07 60 42804 27933
Canada (French) Americas 269 3.10 1.19 431 45762 27703
Canada Americas 131 2.96 1.30 227 41580 26969
China Asia 101 3.05 1.04 171 58838 36372
Czechoslovakia Eastern Europe 256 3.05 1.18 422 44317 29834
Denmark Western Europe 160 2.96 1.09 252 47098 30027
England and Wales Western Europe 2659 2.88 1.09 4476 46727 29429
Finland Western Europe 73 3.07 1.13 146 42560 30225
France Western Europe 412 3.09 1.11 719 43641 28878
Germany Western Europe 3467 2.90 1.10 5833 44586 28339
Greece Western Europe 86 3.02 1.20 142 54232 31381
Hungary Eastern Europe 105 3.02 1.11 190 45941 28399
India Asia 104 3.44 1.21 157 50746 33848
Ireland Western Europe 2434 3.02 1.15 4120 45579 29466
Italy Western Europe 1106 3.09 1.17 1828 47843 29469
Japan Asia 63 2.97 1.20 109 51153 32432
Lithuania Eastern Europe 53 2.94 1.23 98 42494 28234
Mexico Americas 747 3.43 1.20 1334 33180 24663
Netherlands Western Europe 324 3.01 1.17 542 42380 28284
Norway Western Europe 377 2.95 1.10 647 43372 27500
Other Spanish Americas 216 3.46 1.20 358 36054 26230
Philippines Asia 91 3.35 1.21 173 48803 31552
Poland Eastern Europe 567 3.08 1.19 962 47044 28731
Portugal Western Europe 58 3.19 1.08 103 46945 33108
Puerto Rico Americas 228 3.71 1.14 359 31529 25218
Romania Eastern Europe 35 3.26 1.15 54 42258 26312
Russia Eastern Europe 274 3.13 1.14 461 52963 33089
Scotland Western Europe 698 2.82 1.12 1151 46122 28768
Spain Western Europe 221 3.25 1.29 365 41700 29320
Sweden Western Europe 326 2.94 1.07 554 46433 28566
Switzerland Western Europe 96 2.88 1.05 151 45165 31608
West Indies Americas 24 3.71 1.04 44 32209 28850
West Indies (Non-Spanish) Americas 122 3.55 1.23 172 39075 27630
Yugoslavia Eastern Europe 73 3.04 1.05 144 48051 31604
Table 1.2: Descriptive Statistics, Ethnic Group Summary
Country/Region of Origin Continent of Origin
Average Redistribution 
Preferences (GSS) Average Income (GSS)
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N Mean SD N Mean SD
7th Day Adventist Other 99 3.38 1.18 144 36974 26802
African Methodist Episcopal Church Methodist 102 3.50 1.22 163 30326 24461
African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church Methodist 41 3.73 1.25 61 30157 25529
American Baptist Association Baptist 320 3.31 1.16 506 33301 26794
American Baptist Churches in the U.S.A Baptist 148 3.28 1.27 229 31589 25532
American Lutheran Church Lutheran 343 2.90 1.04 477 41963 25292
Apostolic Faith Other 17 3.94 1.14 40 27278 20977
Assembly of God Other 148 3.00 1.12 272 36630 26276
Brethren Church Other 27 3.22 0.97 48 41618 22896
Catholic Catholic 6106 3.13 1.17 10269 44801 29052
Christian Reform Other 46 2.91 0.98 79 42336 27749
Christian Scientist Other 29 3.07 1.36 47 34147 25884
Church of Christ Other 300 2.89 1.20 471 36579 27425
Church of God in Christ Other 32 3.69 1.20 52 24611 19116
Churches of God Other 132 3.23 1.26 219 30733 22876
Congregationalist Other 135 2.96 1.10 242 50457 30015
Disciples of Christ Other 45 3.02 1.03 81 39510 25366
Episcopal Church Episcopalian 571 2.93 1.16 950 53652 32329
Evangelical Lutheran Lutheran 140 2.94 1.04 195 46767 26024
First Christian Other 30 2.87 1.04 57 40864 26098
Free Will Baptist Other 35 3.60 1.22 62 27795 22663
Holiness; Church of Holiness Other 64 3.83 1.18 132 25957 23046
Jehovah's Witnesses Other 165 3.33 1.21 271 33204 24728
Jewish Jewish 488 3.09 1.12 791 58874 33564
Lutheran Church in America Lutheran 116 3.06 0.95 167 50149 30134
Lutheran Church--Missouri Synod Lutheran 347 2.85 1.03 532 45760 27518
Missionary Baptist Other 43 3.51 1.20 61 25340 22139
Mormon Other 360 2.74 1.18 569 42136 27796
National Baptist Convention of America Baptist 111 3.66 1.23 152 34461 29184
National Baptist Convention, U.S.A., Inc Baptist 75 3.53 1.20 99 35860 27466
Nazarene Other 99 3.01 1.05 155 39341 27268
Other Presbyterian Churches Presbyterian 84 2.79 1.08 131 46827 30760
Pentecostal Other 363 3.50 1.20 628 33029 24168
Pentecostal Holiness Other 34 3.21 1.30 71 27537 20095
Presbyterian Church (U.S.A) Presbyterian 84 2.82 1.00 120 52899 30424
Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A Presbyterian 194 2.74 1.06 280 54495 32024
Quaker Other 26 3.04 1.00 43 48365 33391
Reformed Other 34 2.94 1.37 51 37502 22634
Southern Baptist Convention Baptist 1937 3.08 1.21 2856 38951 26507
Unitarian, Universalist Other 73 3.03 0.97 120 59429 33223
United Church of Christ Other 94 3.00 0.99 173 50994 27160
United Methodist Church Methodist 1465 2.89 1.09 2159 44887 28690
United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A Presbyterian 250 2.86 1.03 368 48979 30807
Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod Lutheran 77 2.99 1.08 117 43859 26966
Table 1.3: Descriptive Statistics, Religious Group Summary
Denomination Religion
Average Redistribution 
Preferences (GSS) Average Income (GSS)
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Control Variables 
 The set of control variables (Xi) in the baseline regressions includes a basic suite of variables that 
are specific to the individual including income, gender, age, education, race, marital status, parent’s 
education, employment status, household size and whether or not the individual is self-employed, a union 
member, has children in the household, lives in an urban area or lives in a suburban area.  I introduce as 
controls a set of interacting binary variables for a person's region of residence and year of survey.  This 
set of control variables is used by many other authors in regressions involving redistribution preferences 
(Alesina and La Ferrara 2005, Fong 2000).  
 I also include a variable which controls for the social liberalism of one's ethnic/religious group by 
measuring the average view towards homosexuality of each of these groups.  The GSS asks respondents 
the following question: "What about sexual relations between two adults of the same sex--do you think it 
is always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at all?"  An answer of 
"always wrong" corresponds to a 1 while "not wrong at all" corresponds to a 4.  Using the same 
methodology as for GroupStatusg, I take the average response to this question as reported by a group's 
members and treat that average as the group's tolerance to homosexuality.  In this case, higher values 
correspond to a greater tolerance towards homosexuality and, thus, a greater degree of social liberalism.  
Thus, for respondents of the Jewish faith, this variable takes on a value of 2.9 (indicative of the social 
liberalism of most Jewish-Americans) whereas, for respondents of the more socially conservative 
Mormon faith, this variable takes on a value of 1.32.  In my sample, the mean view towards 
homosexuality of ethnic and religious groups were both around two (Table 1.1), capturing the generally 
negative views towards homosexuality present in the US during the period of time covered (1983 to 
2008). 
  This control variable is useful in these regressions as an individual's group appears to have two 
distinct effects on one's views towards income redistribution.  On the one hand, belonging to a well-to-do 
group suggests that fellow group members are less likely to benefit from increased redistribution.  On the 
other hand, group's with a higher average income level tend to be more socially liberal.  In American 
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politics, a tangible connection is observed between one's social views and one's economic views; the more 
socially liberal one is, the more likely they are to have other liberal political views such as a strong 
preference for income redistribution.  Table 1.4 displays the results of a two OLS regressions in which the 
average redistribution preferences of the ethnic and religious groups in the sample are regressed against 
their average income and average view towards homosexuality.  The coefficients suggest that an extra 
standard deviation in the average income of an ethnic or religious group corresponds to average 
preferences for redistribution which are seventy-five and one hundred percentage points weaker.  On the 
other hand, an extra standard deviation in an ethnic or religious group's average views towards 
homosexuality correspond to average preferences towards redistribution which are twenty-five and fifty 
percentage points stronger.   
 
 The results capture two important correlations: 1) the negative (and statistically significant) 
correlation between a group's average income and its preferences for income redistribution and 2) the 
positive (and statistically significant) correlation between a group's social liberalism and its preferences 
for income redistribution.  Thus, the socioeconomic status of one's group appears to have two distinct 
connections to one's redistribution preferences.  On the one hand, belonging to a relatively rich group is 
associated with a weaker preference for income redistribution as it is expected to decrease the income of 
Table 1.4: Dual Effect of Group Status on Redistribution Preferences
Dependent Variable: Average Redistribution Preferences of Group
(SE) (SE)
Average Income of Ethnic Group (000s) -0.028 *** (0.006)
Average Views Towards Homosexuality of Ethnic Group 0.257 * (0.145)
Average Income of Religious Group (000s) -0.038 *** (0.006)
Average Views Towards Homosexuality of Religious Group 0.367 *** (0.112)
Constant 3.832 *** (0.313) -1.903 *** (0.137)
Observations
Adjusted R²
Notes:
0.6208
*** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and * denotes significance at 
the 10% level.
(2)
Coefficient Coefficient
38 44
(1)
0.3853
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your average fellow group member.  This relationship is the central focus of this paper.  On the other 
hand, belonging to a relatively rich group is also associated with more socially liberal views, views which 
are correlated with stronger preferences for income redistribution.  Thus, controlling for the social 
liberalism of one's groups helps to isolate the (more relevant) negative relationship between the 
socioeconomic status of one's group and an individual's redistribution preferences. 
 In order to examine the underlying channels driving the relationship between group status and 
one's preferences for redistribution, I will utilize two variables for an individual's prospects for social 
mobility.  The first of these is the individual's family income when they were sixteen years old.  
Individuals were asked the following question: "Thinking about the time when you were 16 years old, 
compared with American families in general then, would you say your family income was-far below 
average, below average, average, above average, or far above average?"  This variable takes on values 
from one to five, with higher values corresponding to a higher family income at age sixteen.  The 
respondents in my sample viewed themselves, on average, as belonging to a family which had a slightly 
below average socioeconomic status when they were sixteen years old (Table 1.1).  The second variable 
is whether or not an individual's occupational prestige is greater than their father's was.  The occupational 
prestige of each individual and their father was determined by matching their reported occupation with an 
index (from zero to one hundred) measuring an occupation's prestige developed by the NORC itself.  
Roughly half of my sample has a higher occupational prestige than their father (Table 1.1). 
 I also use a variable to control for the importance of individualism vs. collectivism in a person's 
culture.  The variable was taken from a paper by Suh et al (1998) in which the authors assigned a number 
of countries a rating from one to ten.  Higher values of this rating correspond to a stronger emphasis on 
individualism in that country's culture.  The rating is an average of two separate ratings developed 
independently by Geert Hofstede and Harry Triandis, two leading experts in the field of social 
psychology.  Hofstede based his rating on responses to cross-country surveys he conducted on employees 
of IBM.  Triandis based his rating on his own analysis of empirical research and his personal interactions 
with individuals in the countries rated.  In our sample, the most collectivist culture belongs to China (with 
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an IC rating of 2) while the most individualist cultures belong to England, Wales and Scotland (with an 
IC rating of 8.95).  The average respondent descended from a relatively individualistic culture (7.07). 
1.4 Results 
 In all regressions, standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered by ethnic or 
religious group. All specifications include region-year dummies (excluded for brevity).  All available 
observations are used in every regression.  To begin with, the theoretical framework suggests (as did 
Meltzer and Richard (1981)) that increases in an individual's income have a decreasing effect on their 
redistribution preferences.  The regression results presented in Table 1.5 confirm that the wealthier one is, 
the weaker their redistribution preferences.  Specifically, one extra standard deviation of household 
income correlates to preferences for redistribution which are thirteen percent weaker.   This result is in 
line with the literature.  For instance, Alesina and Giuliano (2009a) found that an extra standard deviation 
of household income was associated with redistribution preferences that were ten percentage points 
weaker.  Similarly, more educated individuals tend to have weaker redistribution preferences.  In 
particular, an extra standard deviation of the high school diploma binary variable is associated with 
redistribution preferences that are eleven percentage points weaker.  Alesina and Giuliano (2009a) found 
that the same variable was correlated to redistribution preferences that are thirteen percentage points 
weaker.   
 Males, the self-employed and married individuals are more likely to have weak preferences for 
redistribution.  An extra standard deviation of each variable is associated with preferences for 
redistribution which are six, four and two percentage points weaker, respectively.  Individuals with an 
educated father tend to also have weaker preferences for redistribution.  Having a father with at least a 
high school diploma is associated with preferences for redistribution that are about two percentage points 
weaker.  On the other hand, African-Americans and unionized workers are more likely to have strong 
redistribution preferences.  An extra standard deviation of each of these variables is associated with 
preferences for redistribution which are thirteen and three percentage points stronger, respectively.  
17 
 
Finally, individuals living in larger households tend to have stronger preferences for redistribution.  The 
relationship is estimated to have a magnitude of three percentage points. 
 
 The key prediction of the theoretical framework is that increases in the average income of one's 
group would serve to decrease one's redistribution preferences.  In column 1 of Table 1.5, the average 
income of one's ethnic group is regressed against one's redistribution preferences.  The results show that 
the higher the income of the average member of one's ethnic group, the weaker one's own redistribution 
Dependent Variable: Subjective preference for income redistribution
(SE) (SE)
Average income of respondent's ethnic group (0000s) -0.154 *** (0.033)
Average view towards homosexuality of respondent's ethnic group 0.353 *** (0.072)
Average income of respondent's religious group (0000s) -0.130 ** (0.055)
Average view towards homosexuality of respondent's religious group 0.319 *** (0.090)
Household income (0000s) -0.052 *** (0.005) -0.052 *** (0.004)
Has a child in the household -0.008 (0.030) -0.007 (0.037)
Size of household 0.023 *** (0.008) 0.029 *** (0.010)
Male -0.137 *** (0.013) -0.129 *** (0.020)
Age 0.008 (0.005) 0.008 ** (0.004)
Age squared (0000s) -1.426 *** (0.446) -1.484 *** (0.398)
Black 0.458 *** (0.030) 0.467 *** (0.049)
Married -0.036 * (0.019) -0.027 * (0.014)
Unemployed 0.088 (0.063) 0.066 * (0.037)
Highest Level of Education Completed
Graduate Degree -0.076 (0.050) -0.203 *** (0.041)
Bachelor's Degree -0.289 *** (0.035) -0.354 *** (0.063)
Associate's Degree -0.200 *** (0.045) -0.233 *** (0.055)
High School -0.225 *** (0.035) -0.256 *** (0.042)
Self-employed -0.128 *** (0.023) -0.130 *** (0.026)
Union member 0.107 *** (0.030) 0.096 *** (0.018)
Father completed more than high school -0.054 ** (0.023) -0.089 *** (0.032)
Father completed high school -0.048 ** (0.021) -0.044 ** (0.017)
Mother completed more than high school -0.035 (0.037) -0.025 (0.033)
Mother completed high school -0.023 (0.022) -0.051 *** (0.017)
Lives in an urban area 0.045 (0.027) 0.057 *** (0.019)
Lives in a suburban area -0.001 (0.032) 0.019 (0.013)
N
Adjusted R²
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by ethnic/religious groups are in parentheses.  Regression 
includes US region-year dummies.  "Less than high school" is the omitted education variable.  *** denotes 
significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and * denotes significance at the 10% level.
Coefficient
0.0950
15087
Table 1.5: Group Status and Preferences for Redistribution
(1) (2)
Coefficient
12647
0.0906
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preferences will be.  The results suggest that a standard deviation increase in the average income of one's 
ethnic group weakens one's preferences for redistribution by eight percentage points.  The social 
liberalism of one's ethnic group also has a significant relationship with one's preferences for 
redistribution.  Belonging to a more socially liberal ethnic group is associated with preferences for 
redistribution which are six percentage points stronger.  In column 2, the average income of one's 
religious group is regressed, along with the same set of control variables, against one's preferences for 
redistribution.  The results show that the wealthier one's religious group, the weaker one's own 
redistribution preferences.  The magnitude of this relationship is roughly seven percentage points.  The 
social liberalism of one's religious group has a positive and significant relationship with one's preferences 
for redistribution, in line with expectations.  The magnitude of this relationship is ten percentage points. 
 These results provide confirming evidence for the theoretical framework's prediction that 𝜕𝑡𝑖
𝜕𝛼𝑔
<
0, when g represents one's ethnic or religious group.  Specifically, the results suggest that the average 
income of one's ethnic and religious groups are correlated with redistribution preferences that are between 
seven and eight percentage points weaker.  While the magnitudes of these correlations are somewhat 
smaller than that of an individual's income or own education level, they are larger than the magnitudes 
associated with being a male, self-employed, unemployed, a unionized worker, an urban resident or 
having an educated father.  While I do not intend to measure the relative importance of one's own income 
vs. the average income of one's group in the utility function, these magnitudes point to the possibility that 
group income is about half as relevant to an individual as their own income (from the theoretical 
framework, 𝛾 ≅ 0.67).  A priori, my expectation was that γ would be much closer to one.  The 
magnitudes of these two key relationships are comparable with those of the variables discussed in the 
literature review.  Living through a recession in one's early adulthood (Giuliano and Spilimbergo 2009) or 
having a history of unemployment or other personal trauma (Alesina and Giuliano 2009a) are each 
associated with preferences for redistribution that are two to five percentage points stronger.  The average 
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preference for redistribution in the home country of one's parents is associated with preferences for 
redistribution that are seven percentage points stronger (Luttmer and Singhal 2011). 
Robustness Analysis 
 In order to determine the robustness of these results, I rerun the baseline regressions with a more 
comprehensive set of control variables (Table 1.6); using alternative measures of group status (Table 1.7); 
using alternative measures of political ideology (Table 1.8); and under a variety of sample restrictions 
(Table 1.9). 
 While the baseline regressions include a large set of control variables, it is always possible that 
the results are being driven by omitted variables.  I first attempt to alleviate this concern by using a 
comprehensive set of control variables (following the methodology of Luttmer and Singhal (2011)).  In 
addition to the baseline control variables, I include third-order polynomials for household income and 
binary variables which capture whether or not the respondent's spouse is currently working, whether the 
respondent has ever worked, the generation the respondent's family migrated to the US, whether the 
respondent attends religious services at least once a month, the respondent's main activity in the last 
week, the spouse's level of education, whether the respondent has ever been unemployed for a month, the 
respondent's occupation and the respondent's industry. 
 Table 1.6 displays the results of regressions including this more expansive set of control variables 
alongside ethnic group income (Row 1a) and religious group income (Row 1b) and the original baseline 
controls.  These results suggest that the relationship between group income and one's preferences for 
redistribution is robust to this comprehensive set of control variables.  The new controls appear to explain 
very little of the relationship found in the baseline results.  Both ethnic and group income are correlated to 
preferences for redistribution which are seven percentage points weaker.  The controls themselves 
produce some intuitive results.  All else equal, the generation in which a respondent's family migrated to 
the US has a significant relationship with one's preferences for redistribution.  Those born outside the US 
appear to have stronger preferences for redistribution than those born in the US.  Among this group of 
people, those with at least one foreign born parent have stronger preferences for redistribution than those 
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whose parents were born in the US.  Finally, among this group of individuals, those with at least one 
foreign born grandparent have stronger preferences for redistribution than those whose grandparents were 
born in the US.  Individuals who attend religious services at least once a month tend to have weaker 
preferences for redistribution, while those who have ever experienced a month of unemployment tend to 
have stronger preferences for redistribution, all else equal. 
 While there are a number of possible explanations for the relationship between group income and 
one's preferences for redistribution, each of these falls into one of two categories.  On the one hand, 
individuals may be directly influenced by their group's status, as posited by this paper's theoretical 
framework.  In this case, group status would have a causal relationship with one's preferences for 
redistribution.  Identity economics suggests that members of groups with low status experience a 
diminished self-image (Akerlof and Kranton 2000).  Policies that redistribute income are expected to 
disproportionately increase the incomes of members of these low status groups.  Thus, an individual can 
attempt to enhance their self-image through the support of redistributive policies which disproportionately 
help increase their group members' incomes and, more broadly, the socioeconomic status of their group 
(Wichardt 2008).  Lipset (1960) posited that leftist voting is often the response of individuals who, after 
exhausting other possible means to attain it, still lack a desired level of social status.  Similarly, an 
individual who belongs to a low status group may be more likely to support redistribution due to in-group 
altruism, given that members of their group will, on average, experience a net benefit from more 
expansive redistributive policies.  A number of examples of in-group altruism support the presence of 
such a channel (Butovskaya et al 2000, Alesina et al 2001, Luttmer 2001).  On the other hand, individuals 
may not be influenced by their group's status.  In this case, group status is correlated with one's 
preferences for redistribution only because it is also correlated with some omitted variables.  While it is 
difficult to provide positive evidence of the former, it is somewhat easier to directly examine the latter.  In 
turn, I include three more control variables to the comprehensive set in order to examine whether or not 
the empirical relationship between group income and one's preferences for redistribution is driven by 
omitted variable bias.   
21 
 
  One such omitted variable is an individual's prospects for social mobility (Benabou and OK 
2001).  On the one hand, individuals who identify with wealthy groups may perceive themselves to be 
more likely to experience upward mobility and, thus, have weaker preferences for redistribution, 
reflecting their expectation of higher future incomes.  Similarly, individuals who identify with relatively 
poor groups may feel that they are more likely to experience a falling or stagnating income and, thus, 
Dependent Variable: Subjective preference for income redistribution
(SE) Adjusted R² N
1) Comprehensive Controls
a) Average income of respondent's ethnic group (0000s) -0.128 *** (0.028) 0.1009 14494
b) Average income of respondent's religious group (0000s) -0.123 ** (0.051) 0.0957 12142
2) Comprehensive Controls + Family income at 16
a) Average income of respondent's ethnic group (0000s) -0.146 *** (0.038) 0.1000 10170
  Family income at 16 -0.014 (0.011)
b) Average income of respondent's religious group (0000s) -0.116 ** (0.057) 0.0930 8564
  Family income at 16 -0.029 ** (0.011)
3) Comprehensive Controls + Greater job prestige than father
a) Average income of respondent's ethnic group (0000s) -0.143 *** (0.037) 0.0930 11600
  Greater job prestige than father -0.034 (0.027)
b) Average income of respondent's religious group (0000s) -0.137 ** (0.056) 0.0940 9838
  Greater job prestige than father -0.028 (0.024)
4) Comprehensive Controls + IC rating of ethnic group
a) Average income of respondent's ethnic group (0000s) -0.117 *** (0.026) 0.0736 11980
  IC rating of ethnic group -0.012 (0.008)
b) Average income of respondent's religious group (0000s) -0.113 * (0.061) 0.0787 8165
  IC rating of ethnic group -0.006 (0.006)
Coefficient
Table 1.6: Group Status and Preferences for Redistribution, Alternative Specifications
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by ethnic/religious groups are in parentheses.  
Comprehensive controls includes the baseline controls as well as third-order polynomials for household 
income and controls for whether or not the spouse is currently working, whether the respondent has ever 
worked, the generation the respondent's family migrated to the US, whether the respondent attends 
religious services at least once a month, the respondent's main activity in the last week, the spouse's level 
of education, whether the respondent has ever been unemployed for a month, the respondent's occupation 
and the respondent's industry.  *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 
5% level and * denotes significance at the 10% level.
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have stronger preferences for redistribution than their individual characteristics would predict, reflecting 
the uncertainty they may feel about the future.  Another potentially omitted variable is a cultural attitude 
of social groups, the importance of individualism vs. collectivism in one's culture.  Cultures that  value 
individualism are typically wealthier than those which value collectivism.  Moreover, it is intuitive to 
expect that a voter who values individualism is likely to have weaker preferences for redistributive 
policies than a voter who values collectivism (Quattrociocchi 2014).  This raises the possibility that 
individuals who identify with wealthier groups are more likely to have an individualistic mentality and, 
thus, have weaker preferences for redistribution. 
 As intuition would suggest, individuals raised in wealthier families tend to have weaker 
preferences for redistribution (Table 1.6, Row 2).  The magnitude of this relationship is estimated to be 
about one to two percentage points.  The significance of this relationship is, however, inconsistent.  The 
second variable controlling for social mobility produces similar results.  While individuals whose job 
prestige is greater than their father's tend to have weaker preferences for redistribution (one to two 
percentage points), the relationship is not statistically significant (Row 3).  Finally, I control for the 
individualism-collectivism of one's culture by including a rating developed by social psychologists 
intended to quantify this particular cultural trait.  I assign each individual a rating for individualism-
collectivism based on the ethnic group they identify with, though only for respondents who've identified 
with a specific country of origin (rather than a region).  Unfortunately, there is no such rating for different 
religious denominations.  As expected, the IC rating of one's ethnic group appears to have a negative 
relationship with one's preferences for redistribution.  This relationship, too, has a magnitude of about one 
to two percentage points and is not statistically significant.   
 These regressions provide evidence that the baseline results are robust to the inclusion of 
variables that control for an individual's intergenerational mobility and the individualism-collectivism of 
one's culture.  In each regression, ethnic or religious group income has a negative and significant 
relationship with one's preferences for redistribution.  When controlling for social mobility, the 
magnitude of the relationship is six to seven percentage points.  This magnitude falls to about four to five 
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percentage points when I control for cultural individualism-collectivism.  However, it is worth noting that 
this decreased magnitude is entirely due to the restricted sample.  Similar coefficients for group income 
are produced when the regressions in Row 4 are rerun without controlling for the IC rating of one's ethnic 
group (but utilising the same restricted sample).  These results provide evidence that these two channels 
are not driving the relationship between group income and one's preferences for redistribution. 
 The robustness of the baseline results is further tested through the use of alternative variables 
intended to capture a group's socioeconomic status (Table 1.7).  In each regression, the baseline controls 
are used, with group income being replaced by each alternate variable.  Five alternate variables were used 
to examine the relationship between ethnic group status and one's preferences for redistribution.  The first 
of these is the mean income of an ethnic group using data from the 2011 US Census.  The results suggest 
that this variable has a negative and significant relationship with one's preferences for redistribution, with 
a magnitude of six percentage points.  Three variables capturing the average level of education in each 
ethnic group are individually included in the baseline regression.  Each of these was derived using GSS 
data, in the same fashion as the group income variables.  The results show that the relationship between 
group status and one's preferences for redistribution holds when we equate ethnic group status to each 
ethnic group's high school completion rate, mean years of schooling and mean level of education 
completed.  In each case, I find a negative and significant coefficient with magnitudes in the range of 
three to five percentage points.  The final alternate group variable is the mean socioeconomic index (SEI) 
of each ethnic group.  The SEI is an occupation specific index constructed by the NORC.  Researchers 
regressed an occupation's prestige score against the mean income and education level of individuals in 
that occupation, using the results to estimate each occupation's SEI.  As with the other GSS-derived group 
variables, I computed this variable by taking the mean SEI of all members of each ethnic group.  I find 
that ethnic group mean SEI has a negative, significant relationship with one's preferences for 
redistribution, with a magnitude of five percentage points.  Finally, rather than examine mean ethnic 
group income at the level of the ethnicity, I examine it at the region level (Africa, Americas, Asia, 
Western Europe and Eastern Europe).  I find that, even when using broader ethnic group definitions, there 
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is a negative and significant relationship between mean ethnic group income and one's preferences for 
redistribution.  Individuals descending from a region with a higher mean income have preferences for 
redistribution which are typically six percentage points weaker. 
 
 Next, I examine the robustness of the baseline religious group status results with a similar set of 
alternate variables.  As the US Census does not enquire about a person's religious group, I instead use the 
results of the 2007 Pew Forum US Religious Landscape Survey as my external data source for religious 
group mean income.  I find that increases in this variable are associated with preferences for redistribution 
which are eight percentage points weaker, in line with the baseline results.  As was the case with ethnic 
groups, belonging to a more educated religious group is correlated with weaker preferences for 
redistribution.  The relationship has a magnitude in the range of six to eight percentage points.  Members 
of religious groups with a higher mean SEI have preferences for redistribution which are six percentage 
Table 1.7: Group Status and Preferences for Redistribution, Alternative Group Variables
Dependent Variable: Subjective preference for income redistribution
(SE) Adjusted R² N
Ethnic Group Variable
Average income of respondent's ethnic group, Census (0000s) -0.055 *** (0.019) 0.0942 15087
High school completion rate of respondent's ethnic group -0.857 *** (0.174) 0.0946 15087
Average years of schooling of respondent's ethnic group -0.063 ** (0.026) 0.0938 15087
Average level of education of respondent's ethnic group -0.142 * (0.084) 0.0934 15087
Average socioeconomic index of respondent's ethnic group -0.015 ** (0.006) 0.0940 15087
Average income of respondent's region (0000s) -0.135 *** (0.028) 0.0933 15087
Religious Group Variable
Average income of respondent's religious group, Pew (0000s) -0.150 *** (0.047) 0.0910 12396
High school completion rate of respondent's religious group -0.899 *** (0.205) 0.0915 12647
Average years of schooling of respondent's religious group -0.107 *** (0.016) 0.0918 12647
Average level of education of respondent's religious group -0.262 *** (0.050) 0.0911 12647
Average socioeconomic index of respondent's religious group -0.014 ** (0.005) 0.0905 12647
Average income of respondent's religion (0000s) -0.235 ** (0.068) 0.0824 10701
Coefficient
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by ethnic/religious groups are in parentheses.  Baseline 
controls used in each regression.  "Respondent's region" refers to one of: Africa, Americas, Asia, Western 
Europe and Eastern Europe.  "Respondent's religion" refers to one of: Catholic, Jewish, Baptist, Methodist, 
Lutheran, Presbyterian, and Episcopalian.  *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at 
the 5% level and * denotes significance at the 10% level.
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points weaker.  One additional variable was used in the case of religious groups, the mean income of each 
religion.  Thus far, all regressions have examined religious groups at the lowest possible level 
(Catholicism, Judaism and a number of Protestant sub-denominations).  In this case, I calculate mean 
income at the level of the religion (Catholicism, Judaism, Baptist, Methodist, Lutheran, Presbyterian and 
Episcopalian). The results suggest that this variable is associated with preferences for redistribution that 
are ten percentage points weaker.  Taken together, the results of Table 1.7 support the idea that the 
baseline results hold even when group status is measured using non-GSS sources, education or SEI rather 
than income and with broader group definitions. 
 I use eight regressions to examine whether group status is correlated to other political preferences 
or choices that are similar in nature to preferences for redistribution (Table 1.8).  To reiterate, the 
dependent variable used in the baseline regressions captures a respondent's preference for the government 
to do more or do less to improve the living standards of the poor.  This is the GSS question most 
commonly used in the literature to capture a person's preferences for redistribution.  The GSS also asks 
respondents to what extent they believe the government should reduce income differences between rich 
and poor.  While a very similar question, this variable is only moderately correlated to our baseline 
question (ρ=0.39).  I find that both ethnic and religious group mean income have a negative and 
significant relationship with this alternate redistribution variable.  The magnitude of each of these 
relationships is three percentage points, about half of the size of the baseline results.  Next, I use 
dependent variables which capture an individual's political views in a more general way.  Respondents of 
the GSS are asked to describe themselves as conservatives or liberals, using a seven-point scale.  Higher 
values of this variable correspond to a more liberal political ideology.  I find that group status has a 
relatively strong correlation with this variable, with a magnitude roughly twice as large as the baseline 
results.  Increases in ethnic and religious group income are associated with a political ideology which is 
sixteen and twenty percentage points more conservative.  GSS respondents are also asked to identify 
themselves as Republicans or Democrats, once more on a seven-point scale.  Individuals belonging to 
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wealthier groups are more likely to identify with the Republican Party, all else equal.  This relationship is 
statistically significant, with a magnitude of four to five percentage points.   
 
 Finally, I examine whether group status is correlated to an individual's actual voting choices.  
While a person's preferences can be very descriptive, it is their choices at the voting booth which 
ultimately influence policy.  Thus, it is useful to determine the extent to which these voting choices are 
correlated to their group's status.  I capture an individual's voting choice using a simple binary variable, 
equal to one if they voted for the Democrat candidate in the most recent Presidential election and zero if 
they voted the Republican candidate.  I find that group status has a  negative and significant relationship 
with the likelihood that one voted for a Democratic presidential candidate.  Individuals belonging to 
wealthier ethnic and religious groups are twelve and six percentage points more likely to vote for a 
Republican presidential candidate.  These results suggest that the baseline results are robust to the use of 
(SE) Adjusted R² N
Dependent Variable
Government should reduce income inequality -0.088 ** (0.037) 0.0553 24987
Political ideology -0.375 *** (0.087) 0.1285 27847
Party identification -0.141 ** (0.057) 0.1010 16768
Voted for Democrat in last presidential election -0.111 *** (0.026) 0.1673 16862
(SE) Adjusted R² N
Dependent Variable
Government should reduce income inequality -0.103 * (0.051) 0.0634 20101
Political ideology -0.443 ** (0.183) 0.1393 22283
Party identification -0.151 ** (0.061) 0.1000 13584
Voted for a Democrat in last presidential election -0.052 * (0.028) 0.1786 14224
Ethnic Group 
Income 
Religious Group 
Income 
Table 1.8: Group Status and Preferences for Redistribution, Alternative Dependent Variables
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by ethnic/religious groups are in parentheses.  
Baseline controls used in each regression.  Higher values of "Political ideology" represent more liberal 
political views.  Higher values of "Party identification" represent stronger identification with the 
Democratic Party.  *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level 
and * denotes significance at the 10% level.
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alternate methods of capturing one's preferences for redistribution.  Moreover, they show that group status 
is not only correlated with one's political preferences, but one's actual voting choices as well. 
 As a final check for robustness, I rerun the baseline regressions on a variety of samples which are 
restricted in some way (Table 1.9).  I find that ethnic group mean income continues to have a negative 
and significant relationship with one's preferences for redistribution when the sample is restricted by the 
respondent's household income.  This relationship also holds when the sample is restricted to respondents 
who are third-generation Americans (defined as being born in the US, with American born parents and 
grandparents), respondents whose family migrated to the US more recently (defined as being foreign born 
or having at least one foreign born parent/grandparent) and respondents who identified with a specific 
country of origin (as opposed to a broader geographic region).  The relationship is also quite robust to the 
exclusion of respondents whose ethnic group descends from a given geographic region.  The coefficient is 
negative in each of the five regressions and statistically significant in all but one.  Religious group income 
has a similarly robust relationship with one's preferences for redistribution.  The negative and significant 
relationship produced in the baseline regressions holds when the sample is restricted by the respondent's 
household income and attendance of religious services, as well as when the sample excludes respondents 
belonging to a given religion.  These findings suggest that the baseline results are not being driven by a 
particular group of respondents.  Rather, the baseline results can be replicated within a number of subsets 
of the overall sample. 
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 Heterogeneity 
 As a final analysis of the data, I examine whether the relationship between group status and one's 
preferences for redistribution is heterogeneous in some meaningful way (Table 1.10).  Each row of Table 
1.10 corresponds to a single regression in which group income is interacted with a dummy variable that 
captures some trait of the respondent.  These tests for heterogeneity focus on traits which speak to an 
(SE) Adjusted R² N
Respondent's household income below median -0.107 *** (0.033) 0.0848 7649
Respondent's household income above median -0.198 *** (0.056) 0.0759 7438
Respondent is at least a third-generation American -0.182 *** (0.047) 0.1217 7862
Respondent's family immigrated to US recently -0.127 *** (0.033) 0.0693 7225
Respondent's ethnic group is a specific country -0.154 *** (0.034) 0.0659 12598
Region of Origin Omitted
Western Europe -0.120 ** (0.048) 0.0836 4937
Eastern Europe -0.153 *** (0.033) 0.1006 14014
Africa -0.140 *** (0.032) 0.0703 13631
Americas -0.110 (0.070) 0.0943 12992
Asia -0.179 *** (0.029) 0.0976 14774
(SE) Adjusted R² N
Respondent's household income below median -0.136 * (0.077) 0.0794 6392
Respondent's household income above median -0.104 * (0.055) 0.0783 6255
Respondent attends religious services at least once a month -0.145 ** (0.070) 0.0977 7103
Respondent attends religious services less than once a month -0.110 ** (0.051) 0.0823 5544
Religion Omitted
Catholic -0.094 * (0.049) 0.1119 7784
Baptist -0.208 *** (0.048) 0.0857 10429
Methodist -0.142 ** (0.061) 0.0882 11280
Lutheran -0.136 ** (0.058) 0.0921 11740
Presbyterian -0.108 * (0.059) 0.0902 12115
Episcopal -0.128 ** (0.058) 0.0892 12201
Judaism -0.125 ** (0.057) 0.0923 12279
Table 1.9: Group Status and Preferences for Redistribution, Sample Restrictions
Ethnic Group 
Income 
Religious Group 
Income 
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by ethnic/religious groups are in parentheses.  Baseline 
controls used in each regression.  "Respondent's family immigrated to US recently" refers to those who are 
either foreign-born themselves or have at least one parent or grandparent who are foreign-born.  *** denotes 
significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and * denotes significance at the 10% 
level.
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individual's assimilation into American society or identification with their group.  I find that ethnic group 
income has a stronger relationship with the preferences for redistribution of respondents with above 
median incomes, who voted in the last election (though not significant), and whose family's American 
ancestry goes back at least three generations.  Similarly, religious group income appears to have a 
stronger relationship with the preferences for redistribution of voters and multi-generation Americans.  
These findings point to the possibility that the relationship between group status and one's redistribution 
preferences may be stronger for those who are more assimilated into American society.  This idea can be 
viewed as either compatible or incompatible with the paper's underlying theory that individuals are aware 
of their group's status and are influenced by it when determining their preferences for redistribution.  On 
the one hand, well assimilated individuals may be particularly frustrated or bothered by their group's lack 
of status and strengthen their preferences for redistribution to a greater degree than less-assimilated 
individuals.  On the other hand, one might expect that more assimilated individuals are less likely to 
identify with their ethnic groups (in particular).   
 Unfortunately, the GSS does not ask respondents to clarify their attachment to their ethnic 
groups.  This makes it very difficult to determine whether those with a stronger attachment to their ethnic 
group have redistribution preferences which are more strongly influenced by their group's income.  The 
GSS does ask respondents how often they attend religious services.  This question can be used to capture 
an individual's attachment to their religious group.  I find that those who attend weekly religious services 
have preferences for redistribution which are more strongly influenced by their religious group's mean 
income.  Of note, the coefficient of both variables in each of the seven regressions is negative and 
significant, further highlighting the robustness of the baseline results.  
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 (SE) Adjusted R² N
Household income
Household income above median -0.162 *** (0.033) 0.0953 15087
Household income below median -0.146 *** (0.033)
p -value on test of equal coefficients 0.0266
Voting
Respondent voted in last election -0.144 *** (0.038) 0.0907 11153
Respondent did not vote in last election -0.127 *** (0.045)
p -value on test of equal coefficients 0.1230
Children in the household
Respondent has children -0.172 *** (0.039) 0.0952 15087
Respondent does not have children -0.106 *** (0.028)
p -value on test of equal coefficients 0.0594
Generations in the US
Respondent's family immigrated to US recently -0.138 *** (0.031) 0.0956 15087
Respondent is at least a third-generation American -0.152 *** (0.030)
p -value on test of equal coefficients 0.0053
(SE) Adjusted R² N
Household income
Household income above median -0.130 ** (0.054) 0.0905 12647
Household income below median -0.130 ** (0.057)
p -value on test of equal coefficients 0.9414
Voting
Respondent voted in last election -0.117 ** (0.055) 0.0860 9438
Respondent did not vote in last election -0.099 * (0.055)
p -value on test of equal coefficients 0.0021
Children in the household
Respondent has children -0.131 ** (0.055) 0.0905 12647
Respondent does not have children -0.128 * (0.068)
p -value on test of equal coefficients 0.9475
Attendance of religious services
Respondent attends religious services at least once a month -0.131 ** (0.054) 0.0905 12647
Respondent attends religious services less than once a month -0.129 ** (0.056)
p -value on test of equal coefficients 0.7995
Table 1.10: Group Status and Preferences for Redistribution, Heterogeneity
Ethnic Group 
Income 
Religious Group 
Income 
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by ethnic/religious groups are in parentheses.  Baseline 
controls used in each regression.  *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% 
level and * denotes significance at the 10% level.
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1.5 Conclusion 
 This paper examines the relationship between an individual's preferences for redistribution and 
the socioeconomic status of their social groups.  I find that members of groups with higher mean incomes 
tend to have weaker preferences for redistribution, all else being equal.  Given the importance of 
redistributive policies in political discourse, and the fact that (to some degree at least) these policies 
reflect the preferences of voters, it is useful to better understand the manner in which individuals arrive at 
these preferences.  While group status seems an obvious determinant of one's preferences for 
redistribution, this paper is the first to examine the relationship in detail using regression analysis on 
survey data.  The findings also establish a relationship between group status and an individual's actual 
voting choice, further connecting this paper to real world policy.  More generally, the findings of this 
analysis provide support for the broader idea that individuals make choices which are not entirely driven 
by economic self-interest.   
 This paper attempts to further extend the concepts of identity economics into the field of political 
economy, as suggested by Akerlof and Kranton (2000).  In the theoretical framework, individuals identify 
with their social groups and are aware of their group's status.  As a result, our identities are positively 
influenced by the status of our social groups.  When the status of one of our groups is relatively low, we 
experience losses in identity.  Income redistribution can be a tool to improve the status of our social 
groups, raising a group with a below-average income closer to the mean.  Thus, individuals belonging to 
groups with a relatively low socioeconomic status may seek to improve their own identity by choosing 
stronger preferences for income redistribution.  This choice may ultimately be driven by self-interest 
(seeking to obtain more personal status by improving the status of a group one identifies with) or by more 
altruistic motives (seeking to help individuals who identify with the same group).  In using survey data to 
examine the relationship between group socioeconomic status and individual redistribution preferences, I 
also expand on recent work in the field of political economy.  Klor and Shayo (2010), in particular, found 
a correlation between the two in an experimental setting using groups divided by program of study.  This 
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paper begins to look at this relationship in the real world, examining the connection between an 
individual's actual preferences for redistribution and the socioeconomic status of groups that they may 
identify very closely to.   
 Regression analysis shows that an extra standard deviation of group-level socioeconomic status is 
associated with preferences for redistribution that are seven to eight percentage points weaker.  This 
paper's results suggest that group status is correlated with redistribution preferences to a degree that is 
roughly equal to that of an individual's own history, whether in terms of cultural influences, economic 
experiences or personal hardships, as determined by the political economic literature.  This result is robust 
to: i) different measures of group status, ii) different measures of one's preferences for redistribution, iii) a 
number of sample restrictions and iv) the inclusion of a number of other explanatory variables.  One such 
set of explanatory variables proxy for an individual's prospects for social mobility.  These variables were 
included as robustness checks due to the possibility that an individual's prospects for social mobility were 
spuriously correlated to group income, on the one hand, and an individual's preferences for redistribution, 
on the other.  I also include a variable which captures the importance of individualism-collectivism in 
one's culture, another factor that may be driving the paper's key relationship.  These robustness checks 
suggest that group status is not correlated to an individual's redistribution preferences due to some 
omitted variables, supporting  (though certainly not proving) the idea that status exerts a causal effect on 
these preferences. 
 Increasing levels of diversity in Europe mean that countries like Germany, France and the UK 
will look more and more like the United States.  Further research can focus on the relationship between 
preferences for redistribution and the socioeconomic status among ethnic and religious groups  in those 
countries.  The regression analysis conducted in this paper also suggests that a religious group's social 
liberalism is at least as correlated to a member's preferences for redistribution as its average income.  
Going forward, it would be interesting to examine this relationship and better understand whether or not 
there exist some factors that simultaneously influence our economic and social policy preferences.   
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Chapter 2: Cultural individualism-collectivism and preferences for 
redistribution 
2.1 Introduction  
 There exists considerable cultural variation across countries.  There is also a great deal of 
variation in preferences for redistribution across countries.  It seems intuitive that culture may be an 
important determinant of a person's preferences for redistribution.  The presence of a relationship between 
culture and preferences for redistribution is supported by recent work.  Luttmer and Singhal (2011) show 
that the preferences for redistribution among European immigrants are influenced by the average 
preferences for redistribution in those immigrants' home countries.  What remains to be examined are the 
specific cultural characteristics which influence an immigrant's taste for redistribution even after they've 
left their home country.  This paper begins to tackle this question by providing evidence that the relative 
importance a culture places on individualism and collectivism explains a great deal of the relationship 
between a person's culture and their preferences for redistribution.   
 I examine the relationship between the individualism-collectivism of an immigrant's home 
country and their own preferences for redistribution using data from the European Social Survey (ESS) 
collected from twenty-nine countries over the years 2002 to 2008.  This data provides detailed 
information on thousands of immigrants who have moved to a European country from any other country 
in the world, including their self-reported preferences for redistribution, various socioeconomic 
characteristics and their country of birth.  Based on their country of birth,  I assign each immigrant their 
home country's individualism-collectivism (IC) rating.   
 This rating (Suh et al 1998) was developed using the input of two eminent social psychologists 
(Geert Hofstede and Harry Triandis) and captures the relative importance a culture places on 
individualism vs. collectivism.  The rating was developed over years of research using both objective and 
subjective inputs.  Suh and his coauthors neatly capture the key difference between people in 
individualistic and collectivist cultures.  Like those in individualistic cultures, "collectivist individuals 
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certainly are aware of and describe their internal attributes.  The critical point, however, is that such 
internal features of the self are not necessarily regarded as the most diagnostic characteristics of an 
individual, and are seldom accepted as legitimate reasons for one's actions in collectivist cultures" (Suh et 
al 1998).  Empirical work by social psychologists corroborates the idea that internal attributes are more 
important to those from individualistic cultures.  For instance, it has been found that the level of 
happiness of a person in an individualistic culture is relatively more correlated with their self-focused 
feelings compared to a person from a collectivist culture.  Self-esteem has a larger positive effect on 
happiness among those from individualist cultures (Kitayama and Markus 1995; Diener and Diener 1995; 
Campbell et al 1996).  Internal emotional conflict similarly tends to have a larger negative effect on 
happiness for people from cultures that value individualism (King and Emmons 1990; Katz and Campbell 
1994; Suh 1994). 
 Social psychology literature suggests that, at their core, individuals of all cultures are aware of 
their personal skills, emotions and interests.  However, it posits that cultures differ with regards to the 
extent that these personal attributes determine an individual's choices.  In individualistic cultures, 
typically found in Western Europe and North America, people are encouraged to utilize their skills to the 
fullest in pursuit of the maximum possible happiness.  Those in collectivist cultures, predominantly found 
in Asia and Africa, are instead taught to be aware of the way in which they fit into and interact with 
society.  I posit that this fundamental cultural difference influences an individual's preferences for policies 
that redistribute income from rich to poor.  A person raised in a collectivist culture is hardwired to 
consider the interests of their group when making a decision.  Thus, it is intuitive to view these 
collectivist minded people as more likely to prefer redistributive policies (higher tax rates, a larger 
welfare state, etc.) that may not necessarily help them, but could help members of their society.  
Individualistic minded people, on the other hand, would intuitively have weaker preferences for 
redistributive policies (prefer lower tax rates, smaller welfare state, etc.) which could help society at large, 
but may negatively affect their own interests. 
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 I find evidence of the existence of a large and significant relationship between the individualism 
of a country's culture and the average preferences for redistribution among natives of that country.  This 
relationship is evident in Figure 2.1.  The horizontal axis of Figure 2.1 measures the individualism-
collectivism rating of an ESS member country (a higher rating implies a greater degree of individualism), 
while the vertical axis measures the average preferences for redistribution among natives in that country.  
Countries with a more individualistic culture are more likely to be made up of natives with weak 
preferences for redistribution.  A standard deviation increase in a country's IC rating is associated with 
average preferences for redistribution which are three-quarters of a standard deviation weaker.   
 
 It is possible that this relationship is being driven by a third variable, a country's income level.  
Conventional wisdom suggests that individualist countries tend to be wealthier, and vice versa.  This is 
corroborated by Figure 2.2.  A standard deviation increase in a country's IC rating is associated with a 
sixty seven percentage point increase in per capita GDP.  Moreover, wealthier countries tend to be made 
up of people with high incomes and are likely less reliant on a welfare state to provide a safety net.  
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Figure 2.1: Preferences for Redistribution by Country's IC Rating
Notes:  Average preferences for redistribution among natives derived from responses to survey question in ESS.  An answer of five indicates strong support for redistribution, an answer of one indicates weak support.  Higher values of the I-C Rating indicate a country with a more individualistic culture.  The regression line has a slope of -0.166 with a standard error of 0.03. The adjusted R² equals 0.49.
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Figure 2.3 shows that wealthier countries tend to be made up of people with weaker preferences for 
redistribution.  Per capita GDP is associated with average preferences for redistribution which are sixty 
six percentage points weaker. 
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Figure 2.2: GDP per Capita by Country's IC Rating
Notes:  GDP per capita is taken from the World Development Indicators database.  It measures GDP in terms of international dollars using 2005 prices.  Higher values of the I-C Rating indicate a country with a more individualistic culture.  The regression line has a slope of 5100 with a standard error of 1181. The adjusted R² equals 0.42.
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Figure 2.3: Preferences for Redistribution by Country's GDP per Capita
Notes:  GDP per capita is taken from the World Development Indicators database.  It measures GDP in terms of international dollars using 2005 prices.  Average preferences for redistribution among natives derived from responses to survey question in ESS.  An answer of five indicates strong support for redistribution, an answer of one indicates weak support. The regression line has a slope of -0.000018 with a standard error of 0000005. The adjusted R² equals 0.31.
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 In order to more accurately determine whether a culture's individualism-collectivism has any 
relationship with the preferences for redistribution of its members, I focus on a specific group of people: 
immigrants.  Immigrants allow me to compare individuals of different cultures while controlling 
somewhat for differences in their socioeconomic environment.  Figure 2.4 shows that immigrants who 
were born in more individualistic cultures are more likely to have weaker preferences for redistribution 
than the natives of their country of residence.  The horizontal axis of Figure 2.4 measures the IC rating of 
an immigrant's home country, while the vertical axis measures the preferences for redistribution among 
immigrants from that country (captured by the average difference between preferences for redistribution 
of immigrants from said country and the average preferences for redistribution of natives in those 
immigrants' country of residence).  Immigrants who were born in countries with a more individualistic 
culture tend to have preferences for redistribution that are half a standard deviation weaker, when 
compared to natives in the country they currently reside. 
 
 This relationship is confirmed through regression analysis, where a number of relevant economic 
and demographic factors are controlled.  The results suggest that an extra standard deviation in the 
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Figure 2.4: Immigrant Preferences for Redistribution by Birth Country IC Rating
Notes:  Immigrant preferences for redistribution is measured in deviation from the mean preference among in the country of residence.  It is then averaged over all countries in which immigrants from a given birth country currently reside.  Higher values of the I-C Rating indicate a country with a more individualistic culture.  The regression line has a slope of -0.047 witha standard error of 0.013. The adjusted R² equals 0.22.
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individualism-collectivism rating of an immigrant's home country is associated with preferences for 
redistribution that are thirteen percentage points weaker.  These results imply that this relationship has a 
magnitude as large as that between household income and one's preferences for redistribution (eleven 
percentage points).  Moreover, this magnitude is as large as that which exists between the average 
preferences for redistribution in an immigrant's home country and an immigrant's preferences for 
redistribution (eleven percentage points) as determined by Luttmer and Singhal (2011).  Further analysis 
confirms that this relationship is robust to a variety of specifications and samples.  While causality cannot 
be definitively proven, concerns that the relationship is driven by omitted variable bias are alleviated as 
best as possible through the use of a broad set of control variables.  In particular, I attempt to control for a 
variety of characteristics of one's birth country including cultural attitudes (views on the trustworthiness, 
fairness and helpfulness of people, the importance of family and the degree to which luck influences 
success), institutional factors (accountability, corruption, stability and effectiveness of government, 
regulatory quality and rule of law) and various social indices developed by the social psychologist Geert 
Hofstede. 
 I also find evidence that the relationship is stronger for voters, those belonging to immigrant 
groups which identify as ethnic minorities and those living in countries with a higher share of ethnic 
minorities.  Moreover, I find that the relationship holds when I use an alternate measure for a country's 
individualism-collectivism, the prevalence of a genetic allele which tends to be more common in 
individualistic cultures.  Culture also appears to influence the relationships that other variables have with 
one's preferences for redistribution in a manner which supports my hypothesis.  Both household income 
and education have a stronger relationship with preferences for redistribution among immigrants born in 
individualistic countries.  This suggests that self-interest serves as a greater motivator for these cultural 
individualists.  I find evidence that cultural individualism-collectivism may be transmitted across 
generations, as the preferences for redistribution of second-generation immigrants appear to be correlated 
to the level of individualism-collectivism in their parent's birth country. 
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 This paper primarily contributes to the literature by providing one explanation for the relationship 
Luttmer and Singhal (2011) found between home country culture and an immigrant's preferences for 
redistribution.  It also begins a line of research which examines the manner in which the individualism-
collectivism of a person's culture influences their economic choices.  The existence of such a relationship 
has a number of implications.  Such a relationship has the potential to influence a country's economic and 
immigration policy as the voting preferences of the populace are shaped not only by their present 
economic circumstances but the cultural beliefs they have inherited from their home country.  This paper 
also adds to the growing literature showing that economic choices cannot be entirely explained by 
economic self-interest.  Instead, culture has an important role to play in influencing a number of such 
choices.  Fernandez (2010) provides a detailed review of this literature, as well as a thorough explanation 
of the epidemiological approach, the empirical strategy used in this and similar papers.   
 In a nutshell, the epidemiological approach focuses on immigrants to determine whether some 
cultural attribute (which varies across immigrant's country of origin) correlates to some economic choice, 
holding constant the economic environment (the immigrant's country of residence) in which the choice is 
made.  Economists have examined the relationship  between culture and a number of economic choices 
using the epidemiological approach, including savings (Carroll, Rhee and Rhee 1994), female labour 
force participation (Antecol 2000; Fernandez 2007; Fernandez 2013; Fernandez and Fogli 2009), fertility 
(Blau 1992; Guinnane, Moehling and Ó'Gráda 2006; Fernandez and Fogli 2006, 2009) and a host of 
others.  In most cases, the authors examine immigrants who've moved to a specific country.  This paper 
follows other recent work (Luttmer and Singhal 2011; Alesina and Giuliano 2009b) by examining 
immigrants who've moved to a number of a different host countries across Europe.  This practice is seen 
to strengthen the empirical analysis as it helps to avoid any selection bias that may exist when using one 
country of residence. 
 In the following section, I examine the data and methodology used in the empirical analysis.  
Section three presents the results of this analysis.  Section four concludes. 
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2.2 Data and Methodology 
 In order to examine the relationship between the cultural individualism-collectivism of one's 
home country and one's preferences for redistribution, I estimate the preferences for redistribution of 
individual i (who was born in country b in geographic region g, resides in country c and responded to the 
European Social Survey in round r), 
 𝑅𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖  = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐼𝐶𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑏  + 𝐗𝐢𝛃𝟐  + 𝜃𝑟𝑐 + γg + 𝜀𝑖 
 where RedistributionPreferencesi captures the strength of individual i's preferences for 
redistribution, 𝐼𝐶𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑏  is the individualism-collectivism rating of home country b, Xi is a set of control 
variables relevant to individual i, 𝜃𝑟𝑐  is a fixed effect for the interaction between ESS round r and 
residence country c of individual i , γg is a fixed effect for the geographic region of birth of individual i 
and 𝜀𝑖 is an error term.  Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered by country of 
birth. 
 The primary source of data is the European Social Survey (ESS).  The ESS is conducted 
biennially by the European Science Foundation.  I use data from the first four rounds that were conducted 
(2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008).  The baseline sample includes immigrants from fifty-five countries, 
distributed across all six continents, who have migrated to one of twenty-five (mostly) European 
countries.   
 Survey respondents are given the statement "the government should take measures to reduce 
differences in income levels" and asked whether they strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, 
disagree or strongly disagree.  The dependent variable, a person's preferences for redistribution, is derived 
by their response.  A response of strongly disagree is given a value of one, while a response of strongly 
agree is given a value of five.  Thus, higher values of this variable correspond to stronger preferences for 
redistribution.    
 The cultural individualism-collectivism in the immigrant's birth country, 𝐼𝐶𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑏 , is captured 
by a rating that was developed by Suh et al (1998), using the input of two eminent social psychologists, 
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Geert Hofstede and Harry Triandis.  Hofstede captured a country's individualism objectively, using the 
results of surveys conducted on IBM employees across a broad set of countries in the 1960s.  Triandis' 
approach was more subjective.  He rated a number of countries on a scale of one (most collectivist) to ten 
(most individualistic) on the basis of empirical research as well as observations of everyday behaviour of 
individuals in various countries.  𝐼𝐶𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑏  is the mean of these separate ratings.  It takes on values from 
one to ten, where higher values represent a more individualistic culture.  Thus, the null hypothesis is that 
β1 < 0.  In this context, an individualistic culture is one which accepts and emphasises the need for 
individuals to act on their own self-interest.  On the other hand, a collectivist culture places greater 
emphasis on the importance of individuals making choices which consider the broader society. 
 When examining robustness, I use an alternate variable to capture a country's individualism-
collectivism.  This variable was taken from a paper by Chiao and Blizinsky (2010).  While human 
behaviour is influenced by a vast number of genes, one of particular importance is the serotonin 
transporter gene, which regulates the concentration of serotonin in various parts of the brain.  A particular 
region of this gene, known as 5-HTTLPR, governs the concentration of serotonin in a person's synaptic 
cleft (the area between the brain's synapses).  There exists two different versions of this particular region 
of the serotonin transporter gene, a short allele version and a long allele version.  Individuals with the 
short allele version have a relatively higher concentration of serotonin in the synaptic cleft and are more 
susceptible to a variety of negative affective disorders, including anxiety and depression.  Chiao and 
Blizinsky propose that societies with a relatively high prevalence of the short allele version of 5-HTTLPR 
(and a relatively high prevalence of negative affective disorders) evolved a more collectivist culture.  
With less emphasis on the individual, those who were more susceptible to negative affective disorders 
became less likely to actually suffer from them.    Countries with a high prevalence of the long allele 
version, on the other hand, evolved an individualistic culture. Figure 2.5 neatly captures this correlation.  
Countries in East Asia simultaneously have a low prevalence of the long allele version of 5-HTTLPR and 
a low individualism rating, while countries in Europe have both a high prevalence of the long allele 
version of 5-HTTLPR and a high individualism rating.  This variable represents the percentage of a 
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country's population which possesses the long allele version of 5-HTTLPR, and indirectly captures the 
importance of individualistic attitudes and behaviours in a given culture. 
 
 The set of control variables (Xi) is expansive and accounts for a number of individual 
characteristics.  In the baseline regressions, these individual characteristics include the immigrant's age, 
gender, education, income, employment status, marital status and urban/rural residence.  I also control for 
the log GDP per capita of the immigrant's home country, taken from the World Development Indicators 
database.  It measures log GDP in terms of international dollars using 2005 prices.  This ensures that any 
relationship between the individualism-collectivism of one's home country and one's preferences for 
redistribution is not being driven by the income level in one's home country.  That is, I control for the 
possibility that wealthier countries tend to i) have a more individualistic culture and ii) produce citizens 
that have relatively weak preferences for redistribution.   
 Robustness checks include increasingly expansive sets of control variables which, among other 
things, control for an immigrant's assimilation into their residence country, religious affiliation and 
intensity, parent's education, occupation and industry, as well as a number of birth country characteristics.  
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Figure 2.5: Country's IC Rating vs its Prevalence of the Long Allele Version of 5-HTTLPR
Notes:  Higher values of the I-C Rating indicate a country with a more individualistic culture.   The regression line has a slope of 9.03 with a standard error of 2.52. The adjusted R² equals 0.31.
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Gini coefficients were taken from the UN-WIDER database and capture the extent of income inequality 
in one's birth country.  A number of variables describing the institutions of one's birth country were taken 
from the World Governance Indicator database.  These variables include voice and accountability, 
political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption.  
These variables range from -3.5 to 3.5, with higher values corresponding to higher quality institutions.  
Utilizing responses to the ESS itself, three variables were constructed which capture the beliefs held by 
natives of one's birth country with respect to the extent to which people believe that others can be trusted, 
try to be fair and try to be helpful.  Higher values of these variables correspond to more positive views of 
society.   
 Two additional variables were constructed from responses to the World Values Survey (WVS), a 
survey similar to the ESS but with an international (rather than simply European) scope.  These variables 
have been used in the broader political economy literature to capture important cultural attitudes.  
Respondents were asked to describe how important family was in their lives, from very important (one, 
on a scale of one to four) to not important at all (four).  Family ties in one's birth country were derived by 
taking the weighted mean of these responses, inverting the values so that higher values of this variable 
correspond to stronger family ties.  Respondents were also asked the extent to which they believed that 
luck (ten, on a scale of one to ten) or hard work (one) led to success.  For each country, I took the 
weighted mean of responses to this question.  Higher values of this variable correspond to a culture that 
believes that success comes mainly from luck. 
 Four variables capturing certain cultural attitudes were taken from Geert Hofstede's database on 
national culture.  The Power Distance Index captures how accepting a society is of hierarchical order and 
inequality.  The Uncertainty Avoidance Index captures the degree to which a society prefers to avoid 
uncertainty and change.  Long term vs. Short term Orientation captures the extent to which a society 
embraces the future and its willingness to abandon tradition.  Indulgence vs. Restraint captures a society's 
willingness to allow people to have fun and enjoy their lives, rather than obey a strict code of social 
norms. 
44 
 
 N IC Rating Prev. of Long Allele Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Total
Argentina 52 4.8 48.96 0 0 0 0 0
Australia 47 9 54.09 0 0 0 0 0
Austria 87 6.75 56.35 81 67 69 0 217
Belarus 94 4 N/A 0 0 0 0 0
Belgium 140 7.25 N/A 80 75 78 95 328
Brazil 98 3.9 53.04 0 0 0 0 0
Bulgaria 59 5 N/A 0 0 8 0 8
Canada 55 8.5 N/A 0 0 0 0 0
Chile 33 4.15 N/A 0 0 0 0 0
China 37 2 24.8 0 0 0 0 0
Colombia 40 2.15 N/A 0 0 0 0 0
Cyprus 0 N/A N/A 0 0 29 0 29
Czech Republic 92 7 N/A 40 52 0 20 112
Denmark 56 7.7 59.2 33 37 41 54 165
Egypt 50 4.4 N/A 0 0 0 0 0
Estonia 30 4 65.19 0 0 0 216 216
Finland 63 7.15 57.55 44 18 27 44 133
France 391 7.05 56.82 0 48 61 66 175
Germany 656 7.35 56.97 111 117 116 126 470
Ghana 16 3 N/A 0 0 0 0 0
Greece 45 5.25 N/A 64 83 0 29 176
Hong Kong 13 4.75 N/A 0 0 0 0 0
Hungary 73 6 58.29 0 23 0 15 38
Iceland 14 7 N/A 0 0 0 0 0
India 120 4.4 41.15 0 0 0 0 0
Indonesia 80 2.2 N/A 0 0 0 0 0
Ireland 65 6 N/A 0 97 148 231 476
Israel 0 N/A N/A 369 0 0 337 706
Italy 339 6.8 51.46 10 16 0 0 26
Japan 10 4.3 19.75 0 0 0 0 0
Korea, Republic of 22 2.4 20.55 0 0 0 0 0
Latvia 31 4 N/A 0 0 0 0 0
Lithuania 33 4 N/A 0 0 0 0 0
Luxembourg 0 N/A N/A 241 265 0 0 506
Mexico 8 4 48.04 0 0 0 0 0
Nepal 3 3 N/A 0 0 0 0 0
Netherlands 143 8.5 57.28 92 84 70 90 336
Nigeria 46 3 N/A 0 0 0 0 0
Norway 28 6.95 N/A 81 53 74 66 274
Pakistan 75 2.2 N/A 0 0 0 0 0
Peru 24 2.8 N/A 0 0 0 0 0
Poland 325 5 63.04 21 16 11 14 62
Portugal 321 3.85 N/A 23 33 22 24 102
Romania 234 5 N/A 0 0 0 0 0
Russian Federation 692 6 56.09 0 0 30 22 52
Singapore 11 3.5 28.76 0 0 0 0 0
Slovakia 106 7 N/A 0 0 0 0 0
Slovenia 15 5 57.48 0 0 0 0 0
South Africa 66 5.75 72.21 0 0 0 0 0
Spain 119 5.55 53.25 23 46 44 77 190
Sweden 137 7.55 56.37 121 0 0 0 121
Switzerland 36 7.9 N/A 222 227 199 237 885
Thailand 23 3 N/A 0 0 0 0 0
Turkey 303 3.85 45.71 0 0 0 0 0
United Kingdom 410 8.95 56.02 113 77 102 149 441
United States 165 9.55 55.47 0 0 0 0 0
Zimbabwe 13 3 N/A 0 0 0 0 0
Country Number of Immigrants into Residence Country
Table 2.1:  Descriptive Statistics, Immigrants by Countries of Birth and Residence
Immigrants from Birth Country
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  Descriptive statistics regarding the birth and residence countries of immigrants in the baseline 
sample are displayed in Table 2.1.  Descriptive statistics of all key variables are displayed in Table 2.2.  
Variable N Mean SD Min Max
Individual preference for redistribution 6244 2.262 1.067 1 5
Birth country IC rating 6244 6.071 1.822 2 9.55
Birth country log GDP per capita 6244 9.764 0.714 7.03 10.64
Birth country Gini coefficient 6244 35.207 8.723 23 73.3
Birth country prevalence of long allele version of 5-HTTLPR 4495 54.909 6.481 19.75 72.21
Household income 6244 6.617 2.781 1 12
Age 6244 47.558 16.669 18 95
Male 6244 0.463 0.499 0 1
Education
Less than High School 6244 0.111 0.314 0 1
High School 6244 0.483 0.500 0 1
Vocational School 6244 0.025 0.155 0 1
University 6244 0.382 0.486 0 1
Partner's Education
No Partner 6244 0.375 0.484 0 1
Less than High School 6244 0.074 0.261 0 1
High School 6244 0.300 0.458 0 1
Vocational School 6244 0.019 0.136 0 1
University 6244 0.226 0.418 0 1
Primary Income Source
Wages and Salary 6244 0.625 0.484 0 1
Self-Employed 6244 0.060 0.238 0 1
Pension 6244 0.214 0.410 0 1
Unemployment Benefits 6244 0.032 0.177 0 1
Social Benefits 6244 0.048 0.214 0 1
Investment 6244 0.007 0.084 0 1
Other 6244 0.014 0.116 0 1
Married 6244 0.554 0.497 0 1
Has a child in the household 6244 0.428 0.495 0 1
Ever unemployed for more than 12 months 6244 0.125 0.330 0 1
Lives in an urban area 6244 0.257 0.450 0 1
Region of Birth: Africa 6244 0.031 0.172 0 1
Region of Birth: Asia 6244 0.112 0.315 0 1
Region of Birth: Europe (EU-15) 6244 0.476 0.499 0 1
Region of Birth: Europe (Post EU-15) 6244 0.160 0.366 0 1
Region of Birth: Europe (Non-EU) 6244 0.138 0.345 0 1
Region of Birth: Latin America 6244 0.041 0.198 0 1
Region of Birth: North America 6244 0.035 0.184 0 1
Region of Birth: Oceania 6244 0.008 0.086 0 1
Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics, Summary of Variables
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2.3 Results 
 Table 2.3 presents regression results which help describe the relationship between cultural 
individualism-collectivism and an immigrant's preference for redistribution.  Immigrants whose birth 
country has a relatively individualistic culture are significantly less likely to support redistribution.  A 
standard deviation increase in the IC rating of one's birth country is associated with preferences for 
redistribution which are thirteen percentage points weaker.  Immigrants born in countries with a relatively 
high log GDP per capita tend to be more supportive of redistributive policies.  This result is in line with 
Luttmer and Singhal (2011).  Those authors opted not to attach any economic significance to the result, as 
they found the magnitude and statistical significance to be inconsistent across samples and specifications.  
Having found the same to be true, I too treat it only as a useful  control variable.   
 Broadly speaking, the other control variables produce intuitive results which are in line with the 
literature.  Older individuals, urban residents, those receiving social benefits and individuals with a 
history of unemployment tend to have stronger preferences for redistribution.  Males, married individuals, 
the self-employed and those who primarily live off of investment income tend to have weaker preferences 
for redistribution.  As expected, the coefficients for income and education are both negative.  Those with 
a university education are significantly less likely to support redistribution than those without one.  The 
same holds for wealthier individuals.  In particular, an extra standard deviation of household income is 
associated with preferences for redistribution which are eleven percentage points weaker.  This result 
suggests that, in terms of determining a person's preferences for redistribution, the individualism-
collectivism of one's birth country culture might be as relevant a factor as one's own income level.  In 
order to better isolate the effect of household income on preferences for redistribution, Luttmer and 
Singhal (2011) run a regression in which the other  income-related control variables (education, spouse's 
education, primary income source) are removed.  Column 2 displays the results of this regression.  An 
extra standard deviation of household income is associated with preferences for redistribution which are 
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thirteen percentage points stronger.  Birth country IC rating is associated with a fourteen percentage point 
decrease in redistribution support, corroborating my earlier observation. 
 
 The relationship between cultural individualism-collectivism and preferences for redistribution 
can be examined in another way.  My main hypothesis is that immigrants from individualist cultures 
Dependent Variable: Subjective preference for income redistribution
(SE) (SE)
Birth Country IC Rating -0.075 *** (0.022) -0.086 *** (0.024)
Birth Country log GDP per capita 0.013 (0.044) 0.021 (0.045)
Household income -0.041 *** (0.007) -0.049 *** (0.005)
Age 0.004 *** (0.001) 0.005 *** (0.001)
Male -0.067 ** (0.029) -0.074 ** (0.029)
Married -0.122 ** (0.056) -0.079 ** (0.038)
Education
High School -0.010 (0.048)
Vocational School 0.073 (0.093)
University -0.130 ** (0.055)
Spouse's Education
Less than High School 0.109 (0.066)
High School 0.092 ** (0.045)
Vocational School 0.032 (0.088)
University 0.025 (0.043)
Primary Income Source
Self-Employed -0.208 *** (0.057)
Pension 0.032 (0.039)
Unemployment Benefits 0.038 (0.077)
Social Benefits 0.093 * (0.052)
Investment -0.374 ** (0.153)
Other -0.280 * (0.148)
Has a child in the household 0.046 (0.036) 0.055 (0.034)
Ever unemployed for more than 12 months 0.172 *** (0.038) 0.159 *** (0.039)
Lives in an urban area 0.091 *** (0.029) 0.059 ** (0.028)
N
Adjusted R²
Coefficient
0.1098
6244
Table 2.3: Individualism-Collectivism and Preferences for Redistribution
(1) (2)
Coefficient
6841
0.1045
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by birth country are in parentheses.  Regressions 
include Region of Birth and Residence Country-Round dummies.  "Less than high school" is the omitted 
education variable.  "Not married" is the omitted spouse education variable.  "Salary and wages" is the omitted 
income source.  Regressions include interaction dummies for residence country-round.  *** denotes 
significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and * denotes significance at the 10% 
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should be more likely to consider their own interests relative to those from collectivist cultures.  If this is 
true, I would expect to find that the relationship between income and preferences for redistribution would 
be stronger for those individualist immigrants.  In order to test this theory, I interact each immigrant's 
household income with a dummy capturing whether they were born in an individualist country or a 
collectivist country.  Individualist countries are those with an IC rating greater or equal to six, while 
collectivist countries are those with an IC rating less than six.  I then rerun the regression in Table 2.3, 
Column 1, replacing birth country IC rating and household income with these two interaction variables.  
The relationship between household income and preferences for redistribution appears to be twice as 
large for immigrants from individualist countries (Table 2.4, Row 1).  A test on equal coefficients 
confirms that this is a statistically significant difference.  I repeat this exercise once more, this time 
examining  education as opposed to income.  In all other regressions, I use education dummy variables to 
better capture the nuances associated with each level of education one might complete.  In this case, I use 
a linear variable for education equal to one for those with less than a high school education and five for 
those with a university education.  I interact each immigrant's education level with a dummy capturing 
whether they were born in an individualist country or a collectivist country and rerun the regression in 
Table 2.3, Column 1, this time replacing the dummies for own education with these two interaction 
variables.  The relationship between education and preferences for redistribution also appears to be twice 
as large for immigrants from individualist countries (Table 2.4, Row 2), with the difference being 
confirmed by a test of equal coefficients. 
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 Robustness Analysis 
 The robustness of this relationship is examined through the use of a variety of specifications 
(Table 2.5), the inclusion of a number of birth country control variables (Table 2.6), sample restrictions 
(Table 2.7) and alternate variables (Tables 2.8 and 2.9).  This analysis provides further support for the 
empirical validity of the relationship between the individualism-collectivism of a person's culture and 
their own preferences for redistribution.  The various specifications differ considerably from the first one 
to the last.  In the first specification of Table 2.5, I regress an individual's subjective preference for 
redistribution only against their home country's IC rating and two sets of dummies.  One set interacts the 
ESS round in which the immigrant participated in the survey and the immigrant's country of residence, 
while the other captures the geographic region in which the respondent's birth country is located.  Home 
country IC rating is estimated to have a significant relationship with one's preferences for redistribution 
with a magnitude of fifteen percentage points.  Under the second specification (the same specification 
used in Table 2.3, Column 1), the magnitude of the relationship is thirteen percentage points.  Moreover, 
all else being equal, respondents from Africa, Asia, North America or a European country outside of the 
EU's original fifteen members tend to have weaker preferences for redistribution than those from a EU-15 
Table 2.4: Self-Interest and Preferences for Redistribution, by Birth Country IC Rating
Dependent Variable: Subjective preference for income redistribution
(SE) Adjusted R² N
p -value
1.  Household income
Individualist birth country -0.054 *** (0.008) 0.1100 6244
Collectivist birth country -0.025 *** (0.008)
p -value on test of equal coefficients 0.0069
2.  Education level
Individualist birth country -0.066 *** (0.015) 0.1085 6244
Collectivist birth country -0.025 * (0.015)
p -value on test of equal coefficients 0.0197
Coefficient
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by birth country are in parentheses.  Regressions include the 
control variables used in Table 2.3, Column 1.  Individualist countries have an IC rating greater than or equal to six, while 
collectivist countries have an IC rating less than six.  *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance 
at the 5% level and * denotes significance at the 10% level.
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nation, all else equal.  The opposite is true for respondents from Australia.  These results were consistent 
across all specifications. 
 The third specification expands the control variable set further by including a quadratic term for 
age, third-order polynomials for household income and dummies which capture whether or not the spouse 
is currently working, whether the respondent has ever worked, whether the respondent is a linguistic 
minority in their residence country, how recently the respondent immigrated and the respondent's 
religious preference.  Under this specification, the key relationship has a magnitude of twelve percentage 
points.  Moreover, this specification provides some evidence that, all else being equal, immigrants who 
have arrived in their residence country in the last ten years have weaker preferences for redistribution 
than immigrants who have lived in their residence country longer than ten years. 
 It stands to reason that the preferences for redistribution of individuals in different countries may 
respond differently to variation in income levels (Luttmer and Singhal 2011).  In order to control for this 
scenario, the fourth specification includes third-order polynomials for income which are interacted with 
the immigrant's country of residence (in addition to the controls used in the third specification).  This 
specification also includes dummies that capture whether the respondent attends religious services at least 
once a month, whether the respondent voted in the most recent national election and whether the 
respondent is a citizen of their residence country.  The key relationship is similarly robust to the inclusion 
of these new control variables.  Its magnitude is estimated at eleven percentage points.  This specification 
produces an interesting secondary finding that voters tend to have weaker preferences for redistribution 
than non-voters, all else being equal. 
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  The final specification is the most comprehensive and includes the variables in specification four 
as well as controls for the respondent's main activity in the last week, the Gini coefficient of the 
respondent's birth country, whether they belong to a union, the education level of the respondent's mother 
and father, the respondent's occupation, the respondent's industry and the geographic region of the 
respondent's birth country.  The magnitude of the key relationship is nine percentage points.  While the 
relationship's magnitude decreases with more and more controls, it is still relatively large and it retains its 
statistical significance (at the 99% level).  The new control variables produce fairly unsurprising results.  
Professionals and those working in the financial industry tend to have weaker preferences for 
redistribution, all else being equal.  The same can be said for individuals with an educated father.  On the 
Table 2.5: Individualism-Collectivism and Preferences for Redistribution, Alternative Specifications
Dependent Variable: Subjective preference for income redistribution
(SE) Adjusted R² N
Specification 1 -0.089 *** (0.018) 0.0772 9972
Specification 2 -0.075 *** (0.022) 0.1098 6244
Specification 3 -0.069 *** (0.020) 0.1147 6244
Specification 4 -0.067 *** (0.019) 0.1174 6244
Specification 5 -0.054 *** (0.018) 0.1239 6244
IC Rating Coefficient
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by birth country are in parentheses.  Specification 
1 includes only region of birth and ESS round-country of residence dummies as controls.  Specification 2 
includes the same controls as the baseline regressions in Table 2.3, Column 1.  Specification 3 includes 
the baseline controls as well as a quadratic term for age, third-order polynomials for log household 
income and controls for whether or not the spouse is currently working, whether the respondent has 
ever worked, whether the respondent is a linguistic minority in their residence country, how recently the 
respondent immigrated, the respondent's religious preference.  Specification 4 includes the same controls 
as #3, but interacts the third-order polynomials for log household income with the respondent's country 
of residence.  This specification also includes dummies that capture whether the respondent attends 
religious services at least once a month, whether the respondent voted in the most recent national 
election and whether the respondent is a citizen of their residence country.  Specification 5 includes the 
same controls as #4, as well as controls for the respondent's main activity in the last week, the Gini 
coefficient of the respondent's birth country, whether they belong to a union, the education level of the 
respondent's mother and father, the respondent's occupation and the respondent's industry.  *** 
denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and * denotes significance 
at the 10% level.
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other hand, union members and unemployed workers who were looking for a job tend to have stronger 
preferences for redistribution.   
 In order to better determine whether the observed relationship between individualism-
collectivism and one's preferences for redistribution truly exists, and is not being driven by some omitted 
variables, I include a number of birth country variables to the last (and most comprehensive) specification 
used in Table 2.5.  While Luttmer and Singhal (2011) find evidence that culture influences one's 
preferences for redistribution, it remains to be seen which exact aspects of one's birth country is driving 
this.  This paper provides evidence that the relationship is driven in part by the individualism-collectivism 
of one's birth country. However, there are a number of other possible factors. In turn, I include variables 
capturing a handful of cultural attitudes (views on the trustworthiness, fairness and helpfulness of people, 
the acceptance of hierarchical order, the avoidance of uncertainty and change, the embracement of the 
future and the enjoyment of life, the importance of family and the degree to which luck influences 
success) and institutional characteristics (accountability, corruption, effectiveness and stability of 
government, regulatory quality and rule of law) of one's birth country into the most comprehensive 
specification used in Table 2.5 in order to better understand if this paper's relationship is being driven by 
omitted variable bias.  The results of these regressions are found in Table 2.6.  In each case, the birth 
country IC rating retains its statistical significance.  Ranging in magnitude from seven to thirteen 
percentage points, the relationship appears to retain its economic significance as well.  Nevertheless, there 
may yet be some  still omitted variables driving the relationship.  Of the fifteen newly included birth 
country variables, three produced coefficients that were statistically significant (all at the ninety-five 
percent confidence level).  Immigrants born in countries with a short term oriented (traditionalist) culture 
appear to have stronger preferences for redistribution, as do those from countries with strong family ties 
and a high level of government accountability. 
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  The relationship is also robust to a variety of sample restrictions (Table 2.7).  In each of these 
regressions, the third specification of Table 2.5 was used.  These restrictions include omitting immigrants 
Table 2.6: Individualism-Collectivism and Preferences for Redistribution, Birth Country Control Variables
Dependent Variable: Subjective preference for income redistribution
(SE) Adjusted R² N
ESS:  People can be trusted -0.075 *** (0.021) 0.1202 4731
ESS:  People try to be fair -0.073 *** (0.021) 0.1203 4731
ESS:  People try to be helpful -0.077 *** (0.022) 0.1202 4731
Hofstede:  Power distance index -0.044 * (0.022) 0.1226 4923
Hofstede:  Uncertainty avoidance index -0.083 ** (0.033) 0.1228 4923
Hofstede:  Long term vs. short term normative orientation -0.051 ** (0.022) 0.1227 5083
Hofstede:  Indulgence vs. restraint -0.061 ** (0.025) 0.1220 5008
WVS:  Family ties -0.051 *** (0.019) 0.1276 5513
WVS:  Luck determines success more than hard work -0.056 ** (0.023) 0.1271 5476
WGI:  Voice and accountability -0.059 *** (0.017) 0.1243 6244
WGI:  Control of corruption -0.054 *** (0.018) 0.1238 6244
WGI:  Government effectiveness -0.054 *** (0.018) 0.1238 6244
WGI:  Political stability and absence of violence -0.050 *** (0.017) 0.1240 6244
WGI:  Regulatory quality -0.052 *** (0.019) 0.1238 6244
WGI:  Rule of law -0.055 *** (0.018) 0.1238 6244
IC Rating Coefficient
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by birth country are in parentheses.  Each specification includes 
includes the same controls as the baseline regressions in Table 2.3, Column 1, as well as a quadratic term for age, third-order 
polynomials for log household income interacted with the respondent's country of residence, controls for whether or not the 
spouse is currently working, whether the respondent has ever worked, whether the respondent is a linguistic minority in their 
residence country, how recently the respondent immigrated, the respondent's religious preference, dummies that capture 
whether the respondent attends religious services at least once a month, whether the respondent voted in the most recent 
national election, whether the respondent is a citizen of their residence country, the respondent's main activity in the last 
week, the Gini coefficient of the respondent's birth country, whether they belong to a union, the education level of the 
respondent's mother and father, the respondent's occupation and the respondent's industry.  *** denotes significance at the 
1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and * denotes significance at the 10% level.
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from the two, five and twelve countries with the highest and lowest IC ratings or those from an Eastern 
Bloc country.  Regressions were also run on samples composed only of immigrants from European 
countries, non-European countries, countries with an above average IC rating and countries with a below 
average IC rating.  In each case, the relationship is statistically significant and has a magnitude between 
seven and thirteen percentage points, comparable to the original regressions. 
 
 Thus far, the level of individualism-collectivism present in a country has been captured by a 
rating developed by social psychologists.  Recent work in various fields of biology suggest that a culture's 
level of individualism-collectivism is strongly correlated to the frequency of the long allele version of a 
particular region (5-HTTLPR) of the serotonin transporter gene within that culture's population (Chiao 
and Blizinsky 2010).  Individuals with the long allele version are less susceptible to a variety of negative 
affective disorders, including anxiety and depression, than those with the short allele version.  Thus, while 
populations with a high frequency of the short allele version evolved more collectivist cultures (which put 
Table 2.7: Individualism-Collectivism and Preferences for Redistribution, Sample Restrictions
Dependent Variable: Subjective preference for income redistribution
(SE) Adjusted R² N
Two highest/lowest IC rating countries omitted -0.067 *** (0.021) 0.1085 5955
Five highest/lowest IC rating countries omitted -0.072 *** (0.025) 0.1103 5170
Twelve highest/lowest IC rating countries omitted -0.075 *** (0.021) 0.1068 3957
Eastern Bloc countries omitted -0.069 *** (0.022) 0.1197 4460
Respondent born in Europe -0.083 *** (0.024) 0.1104 4834
Respondent born outside of Europe -0.051 * (0.026) 0.1388 1410
Respondent's home country has IC rating ≥ 6 -0.089 ** (0.032) 0.1152 3795
Respondent's home country has IC rating < 6 -0.072 ** (0.030) 0.1120 2449
IC Rating Coefficient
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by birth country are in parentheses.  Regressions include 
the control variables used in Table 2.5, Specification 3.  *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes 
significance at the 5% level and * denotes significance at the 10% level.
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less social pressure on the individual, making them less likely to suffer from the negative affective 
disorders they may have been prone to), populations with a high frequency of the long allele version 
evolved more individualistic cultures. 
 As a final robustness check, the regressions of Tables 2.3 and 2.4 are rerun using the prevalence 
of the long allele version of 5-HTTLPR in the respondent's birth country in place of the individualism-
collectivism rating.  The prevalence of the long allele version is used instead of the short allele version as 
it is positively correlated with a country's IC rating and, thus, makes for a more straightforward 
replacement.  A higher prevalence of the long allele version is synonymous with a lower prevalence of 
the short allele version, and vice versa, as those are the only two possible types of allele.  The results of 
these regressions are displayed in Tables 2.8 and 2.9.  These regressions corroborate the baseline results.  
Individuals born in countries with a higher prevalence of the long allele version of 5-HTTLPR tend to 
have weaker preferences for redistribution (Table 2.8).  In this regression, the broadest set of control 
variables (taken from Table 2.5, Specification 5) are used.   An extra standard deviation of this variable is 
associated with preferences for redistribution which are thirteen percentage points weaker.  Moreover, 
both household income and education have a stronger relationship with the preferences for redistribution 
of those born in countries with a high prevalence of the long allele version of 5-HTTLPR (Table 2.9).  A 
country is considered to have a high prevalence of the long allele version if at least fifty-six percent of the 
population possesses it.  This threshold splits the set of birth countries for which data is available in half.  
Moreover, the specification from the baseline regression (Table 2.3, Column 1) is used. 
 
Table 2.8: Individualism-Collectivism and Preferences for Redistribution, Genetic Data
Dependent Variable: Subjective preference for income redistribution
Explanatory Variable (SE) Adjusted R² N
Prevalence of long allele version of 5-HTTLPR in birth country -0.021 *** (0.004) 0.1220 4495
Coefficient
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by birth country are in parentheses.  Regressions include the 
control variables used in Table 2.5, Specification 5.  *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at 
the 5% level and * denotes significance at the 10% level.
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 Heterogeneity 
 It is unlikely that all immigrants are influenced to the same degree by the individualism-
collectivism of their ancestral culture.  Luttmer and Singhal (2011) provide a useful template for 
examining the heterogeneity of culture's relationship with preferences for redistribution among 
immigrants.  They interact their cultural variable with a variety of dummies which capture some aspect of 
the immigrant, their group or their residence country.  In Rows 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Table 2.10, I interact birth 
country IC rating with dummies that capture whether an immigrant has lived in their country of residence 
for more than twenty years, is a citizen of their country of residence, voted in the last national election or 
has children in the household.  Luttmer and Singhal (2011) found that culture had a larger influence on 
the preferences for redistribution of recent immigrants, non-citizens, non-voters and those without 
children in the household.  I find less conclusive evidence that birth country IC rating has a heterogeneous 
relationship with immigrant's preferences for redistribution, though I do find that the relationship is 
stronger among voters than non-voters.  In each case, the individual coefficients themselves are 
statistically significant.   These results suggest that the influence of cultural individualism-collectivism on 
Table 2.9: Self-Interest and Preferences for Redistribution, Genetic Data
Dependent Variable: Subjective preference for income redistribution
(SE) Adjusted R² N
p -value
1.  Household income
High prevalence of long allele version of 5-HTTLPR in birth country -0.056 *** (0.009) 0.1125 4495
Low prevalence of long allele version of 5-HTTLPR in birth country -0.025 ** (0.010)
p -value on test of equal coefficients 0.0048
2.  Education level
High prevalence of long allele version of 5-HTTLPR in birth country -0.144 *** (0.045) 0.1034 4495
Low prevalence of long allele version of 5-HTTLPR in birth country -0.094 ** (0.046)
p -value on test of equal coefficients 0.0271
Coefficient
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by birth country are in parentheses.  Regressions include the control 
variables used in Table 2.3, Column 1.  A country is considered to have a high prevalence of the long allele version of 5-
HTTLPR if at least 56% of its population possesses that allele.  *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes 
significance at the 5% level and * denotes significance at the 10% level.
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one's preference for redistribution persists even after living in a residence country for decades and 
becoming a citizen. 
 Rows 5 and 6 examine how the relationship differs in magnitude for immigrants who are 
linguistic or ethnic minorities.  An immigrant is considered a linguistic minority if the language they 
speak at home is spoken by less than thirty percent of the native population in their residence country.  
While it would be straightforward to use the respondent's self-reported ethnic minority status, Luttmer 
and Singhal (2011) were justifiably concerned that this subjective variable may be correlated with omitted 
variables.  Instead, they constructed a variable equal to the share of immigrants from an immigrant's birth 
country living in the same residence country who identify as ethnic minorities.  An immigrant is 
considered an ethnic minority if this variable is above median across all immigrant groups in each country 
of residence.  The relationship appears to be stronger for immigrants who speak a minority language at 
home (though the difference is not statistically significant) and whose group members identify as ethnic 
minorities.  Luttmer and Singhal (2011) came to similar conclusions, pointing out that minorities may 
have more trouble assimilating into their new country's culture, which leads them to be more influenced 
by their birth country's culture.   
 Row 7 examines whether the preferences for redistribution of immigrants belonging to relatively 
large immigrant groups are more or less influenced by their birth country's IC rating.  Luttmer and 
Singhal (2011) found that culture, in a general sense, had a much stronger relationship with the 
preferences for redistribution of immigrants from larger groups.  My results suggest that group size has 
little effect on the strength of the relationship between the individualism-collectivism of one's culture and 
an immigrant's preferences for redistribution.  While the coefficient for immigrants belonging to smaller 
groups is slightly larger, the difference is not statistically significant.  Finally, I examine how this 
relationship varies depending on the characteristics of an immigrant's residence country.  The preferences 
for redistribution of immigrants living in countries with a high proportion of ethnic minorities tend to be 
more strongly influenced by their birth country's IC rating (Row 8).  Luttmer and Singhal (2011) found 
the same result when examining culture more generally.  This result is intuitive as countries with a large 
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proportion of ethnic minorities are likely more multicultural, with less pressure being put on immigrants 
to assimilate into their residence country's culture.  Luttmer and Singhal (2011) similarly determined that 
culture's influence on preferences for redistribution was stronger for those living in countries with a high 
fraction of immigrants.  However, the difference across low- and high-immigrant countries wasn't as 
strong as the difference between low- and high-ethnic minority countries.  This, too, is intuitive as some 
of those immigrants may have a culture or speak a language that is not too far removed from that of their 
residence country.  Thus, compared to those immigrants who identify as ethnic minorities, immigrants in 
general may find it easier to assimilate into their new country's culture.  I come to a similar conclusion.  
Those living in high-immigrant countries do not appear to be more strongly influenced by their birth 
country's IC rating (Row 9). 
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 Table 2.10: Individualism-Collectivism and Preferences for Redistribution, Heterogeneity
Dependent Variable: Subjective preference for income redistribution
(SE) Adjusted R² N
p -value
1.  Time lived in residence country
   Has lived in residence country for ≤ 20 years -0.077 *** (0.023) 0.1146 6244
   Has lived in residence country for > 20 years -0.062 *** (0.019)
p -value on test of equal coefficients 0.2127
2.  Citizenship
   Citizen of residence country -0.069 *** (0.020) 0.1142 6232
   Non-citizen of residence country -0.069 *** (0.021)
p -value on test of equal coefficients 0.9084
3.  Voting
   Voted in last national election -0.036 *** (0.010) 0.1136 6244
   Did not vote in last national election -0.028 ** (0.012)
p -value on test of equal coefficients 0.0280
4.  Children in the household
   Has children in the household -0.074 *** (0.023) 0.1144 6244
   Does not have children in the household -0.066 *** (0.021)
p -value on test of equal coefficients 0.6097
5.  Language spoken
   Speaks the dominant language at home -0.057 ** (0.022) 0.1149 6244
   Speaks a minority language at home -0.088 *** (0.025)
p -value on test of equal coefficients 0.2315
6.  Fraction of immigrant group identifying as ethnic minority
   Fraction below median -0.065 *** (0.020) 0.1155 6244
   Fraction above median -0.079 *** (0.020)
p -value on test of equal coefficients 0.0115
7.  Fraction of immigrant group within residence country
   Fraction below median -0.073 *** (0.019) 0.1146 6244
   Fraction above median -0.067 *** (0.022)
p -value on test of equal coefficients 0.4792
8.  Fraction of residence country identifying as ethnic minority
   Fraction below median -0.047 ** (0.021) 0.1157 6244
   Fraction above median -0.094 *** (0.021)
p -value on test of equal coefficients 0.0319
9.  Fraction of residence country identifying as immigrant
   Fraction below median -0.063 *** (0.020) 0.1145 6244
   Fraction above median -0.075 *** (0.023)
p -value on test of equal coefficients 0.5179
IC Rating Coefficient
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by birth country are in parentheses.  Regressions include the control variables 
used in Table 2.5, Specification 3.  Methodology borrowed from Luttmer and Singhal (2011): "Immigrant groups are defined both by 
country of birth and by country of residence. Thus, the population fraction of immigrant group is measured as the ratio of 
immigrants from a particular birth country to the total population in their country of residence. In rows 6 through 9, the median is 
taken over all immigrants from ESS countries in the ESS dataset. A language is defined as dominant if more than 30 percent of the 
native population speaks it as a primary language in the home."  *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at 
the 5% level and * denotes significance at the 10% level.
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Intergenerational Transmission of Culture 
 Thus far, I have examined the manner in which an immigrant's birth country culture influences 
their preferences for redistribution.  It is also worth exploring the degree to which an immigrant's culture 
influences the preferences for redistribution of their locally born children.  To do so, I employ two 
strategies used earlier in this paper.  However, instead of using a sample of first-generation immigrants, I 
use samples of second-generation immigrants.  To begin, I construct three new samples which include 
individuals who were born in their country of residence but either i) have a foreign-born father (2698 
respondents), ii) have a foreign-born mother (2695 respondents) or iii) have foreign-born parents with the 
same country of birth (963 respondents).  In each regression, reported in Table 2.11, I use the control 
variables used in Table 2.5, Specification 5.  I find that the three samples produce similar results.  In each 
case, the sign of the coefficient is the same as the baseline results.  Individuals whose parent(s) were born 
in countries with more individualistic cultures tend to have weaker preferences for redistribution in their 
country of residence (Rows 1 to 3).  The magnitudes of these relationships vary from six to nine 
percentage points, though the coefficient is only statistically significant for those with a foreign-born 
father.  Similarly, individuals whose parent(s) were born in countries with a high prevalence of the long 
allele version of 5-HTTLPR tend to have weaker preferences for redistribution (Rows 4 to 6).  These 
relationships vary in magnitude from seven to fifteen percentage points.  However, once more, the 
coefficient is accurately estimated in only one case (foreign-born mother).  These results suggest that a 
second-generation immigrant's preferences for redistribution may be influenced by the individualism-
collectivism of their ancestral culture in the expected manner, though said influence is weaker than in the 
case of first-generation immigrants, who were directly exposed to their ancestral culture. 
61 
 
  As discussed earlier, culture may not only directly influence one's preferences for redistribution 
but may also affect the way other factors influence these preferences.  In particular, I found that first-
generation immigrants born in relatively individualist countries had preferences for redistribution that 
were more strongly influenced by self-interest (income and education) than those born in relatively 
collectivist countries (Table 2.4).  In Table 2.12, I repeat these regressions, this time interacting each 
second-generation immigrant's household income and education level with a dummy capturing whether 
their father/mother was born in an individualist country or a collectivist country.  Individualist countries 
are those with an IC rating greater or equal to six, while collectivist countries are those with an IC rating 
less than six.  These four regressions produce very consistent results.  In each case, a second-generation 
immigrant's household income or education level is associated with weaker preferences for redistribution.  
However, the magnitude of these relationships is larger for those whose father/mother was born in an 
individualist country, with the difference being statistically significant in all four regressions.  These 
results suggest that second-generation immigrants whose parents were born in relatively individualist 
countries have preferences for redistribution that are more strongly influenced by self-interest than those 
descending from relatively collectivist countries.  Together, the results of Tables 2.11 and 2.12 support 
the possibility that cultural individualism-collectivism is transmitted across generations, and influences 
the preferences for redistribution of both first- and second-generation immigrants.  While the direct effect 
Table 2.11: Individualism-Collectivism and Preferences for Redistribution, Second Generation
Dependent Variable: Subjective preference for income redistribution
(SE) Adjusted R² N
1.  IC rating of father's birth country -0.038 * (0.019) 0.1478 2698
2.  IC rating of mother's birth country -0.038 (0.028) 0.1430 2695
3.  IC rating of parents' birth country -0.059 (0.052) 0.2082 963
4.  Prevalence of long allele version of 5-HTTLPR in father's birth country -0.013 (0.009) 0.1425 2006
5.  Prevalence of long allele version of 5-HTTLPR in mother's birth country -0.030 *** (0.008) 0.1601 2026
6.  Prevalence of long allele version of 5-HTTLPR in parent's birth country -0.021 (0.013) 0.1909 725
IC Rating Coefficient
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by parent's birth country are in parentheses.  Regressions include the control 
variables used in Table 2.5, Specification 5.  *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level and * 
denotes significance at the 10% level.
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of cultural individualism-collectivism on a second-generation immigrant's preferences for redistribution 
appears weaker than in the case of first-generation immigrants, this cultural trait appears to strongly 
influence the degree to which both first- and second-generation immigrants, and their preferences for 
redistribution, are motivated by self-interest. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 When an individual migrates from their homeland, they bring along with them a culture that bears 
an influence on the new lives which they seek to create.  A culture which is formed by a collection of 
different cultural attitudes.  My analysis focuses on one such cultural trait, individualism-collectivism. 
Simply put, social psychology theory posits that those from individualistic cultures tend to be more 
Table 2.12: Self-Interest and Preferences for Redistribution, by IC Rating of Parent's Birth Country
Dependent Variable: Subjective preference for income redistribution
(SE) Adjusted R² N
p -value
1.  Household income
Father born in Individualist country -0.057 *** (0.010) 0.1269 2699
Father born in Collectivist country -0.042 *** (0.014)
p -value on test of equal coefficients 0.0745
2.  Household income
Mother born in Individualist country -0.066 *** (0.011) 0.1264 2695
Mother born in Collectivist country -0.046 *** (0.012)
p -value on test of equal coefficients 0.0082
3.  Education level
Father born in Individualist country -0.055 *** (0.016) 0.1237 2699
Father born in Collectivist country -0.014 (0.022)
p -value on test of equal coefficients 0.0124
4.  Education level
Mother born in Individualist country -0.072 *** (0.022) 0.1237 2695
Mother born in Collectivist country -0.020 (0.022)
p -value on test of equal coefficients 0.0005
IC Rating Coefficient
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by parent birth country are in parentheses.  Regressions 
include the control variables used in Table 2.3, Column 1.  Individualist countries have an IC rating greater than or 
equal to six, while collectivist countries have an IC rating less than six.  *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** 
denotes significance at the 5% level and * denotes significance at the 10% level.
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motivated by internal attributes and self-interest, whereas those from collectivist cultures are more likely 
to consider others when making personal decisions.  I find that cultural individualism-collectivism has a 
significant influence on the preferences for redistribution of immigrants.  This influence is significant in 
both a statistical and economic sense, as it appears to be as important as one's own income.  Moreover, 
this influence holds i) in a variety of samples, ii) in spite of the inclusion of numerous controls and iii) 
when an alternate independent variable is used.  The individualism-collectivism of an immigrant's home 
country appears to have a stronger relationship with the redistribution preferences of voters, those 
belonging to ethnic minority groups and those currently living in relatively multicultural countries.  This 
relationship also seems to persist into the second-generation.  Cultural individualism-collectivism also has 
an indirect influence on an immigrant's preferences for redistribution, as those born in more 
individualistic countries (or whose parents were born in more individualistic countries) tend to be more 
strongly influenced by self-interest.  Own income and education appear to have a stronger relationship 
with one's preferences for redistribution among immigrants from individualistic cultures.  This result also 
holds for second-generation immigrants who were born locally, but have foreign-born parents. 
 Through these empirical findings, I am able to make a number of contributions to the literature.  
At a basic level, these results add further weight behind the argument that an individual's preferences for 
redistribution are not simply determined by their own self-interest and the socioeconomic environment 
within which they live.  Rather, these preferences are also influenced by a cultural attitude which they've 
inherited at birth.  Simultaneously, this finding helps develop a prior line of research while establishing a 
new line of its own.  Luttmer and Singhal (2011) showed that culture, in general, has a significant 
influence on immigrants' preferences for redistribution.  My results offer a specific channel through 
which culture bears this influence.  While it may ultimately be the case that the relationship between 
individualism-collectivism and preferences for redistribution is being driven by some omitted variables, I 
have made efforts to deal with this issue by using a large set of control variables capturing details of both 
the individual survey respondents and the respondent's birth country.  I also find evidence suggesting that 
this cultural trait is transmitted across generations and bears some influence on the redistribution 
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preferences of second-generation immigrants.  It also seems fruitful to further research the relationship 
between the prevalence of the long/short allele versions of 5-HTTLPR in one's birth country and one's 
preferences for redistribution (or various other economic choices and preferences). 
 These findings have useful implications both across and within countries.  First, cross-country 
differences in individualism-collectivism provide an explanation for (at least part of) the variation in 
redistributive policies around the world.  Second, the influx of migrants into a country will have some 
effect on that country's culture.  While immigrants do much of the assimilation, the local culture of an 
immigrant's new home itself often adopts some of the cultural attitudes and practices of their new 
residents.  In particular, immigrants have the potential to influence the balance between individualism and 
collectivism that exists in their new country's culture.  As this cultural balance changes, so too can the 
preferences for redistribution of the citizenry and, consequently, the country's redistributive policies.  
More fundamentally, my analysis suggests that this particular cultural trait may determine how relevant 
self-interest is to an individual's economic choices.  Given the central importance of self-interest in 
economics, this represents a promising line of research going forward.  
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